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Both the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Property Right Theory (PRT) 
start with the assumptions that transactions often involve with specialized investments 
while contracts are incomplete. Holdups thus arise. Both the TCE and the PRT 
maintain that the governance structure of a transaction matters in containing 
inefficiencies associated with holdups. Much confusion arises: while some scholars 
treat the TCE and the PRT as one stream of theory with the latter formalizing the 
former, others contend that they are two distinct theories with different empirical 
implications.  
 
In this dissertation, I argued that the TCE and the PRT are two distinct theories; the 
former assumes that integration results in unified management while the latter 
assumes that the investment decisions remain decentralized after integration. I argued 
that the explanatory power of the two theories depends on the context of a transaction: 
the PRT is preferred in a context where trading partners differ significantly in their 
knowledge bases, decision-making structures, and reward systems; the TCE is 
preferred in a context that partners are similar. I found support for falsifiable 
hypotheses that were developed based on above arguments by studying the 
governance structures of 285 R&D projects in the biopharmaceutical industry.   
 
 vi 
The PRT argues that opportunism exists in all kinds of organizational forms. In an 
alliance, the optimal way of allocating property rights is to assign them to the party 
whose investments critically affect the alliance performance. However, the party with 
greater bargaining power tends to grab more property rights. As a result, the actual 
allocation of property rights often deviates from the optimal way specified by the 
PRT. By studying 222 biotech-pharmaceutical alliances, I found that the bargaining 
power of a party is positively correlated with property rights assigned to her. I also 
found that the prior interactions and the density of indirect channels between partners 
contain the negative impact of misallocating property rights on alliance performance. 
I therefore concluded that it is necessary to consider the effects of the social contexts 
in evaluating the impact of formal contractual structures on alliance performance.  
 vii 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
The ability of firms to continually update and exploit their knowledge bases has 
become an imperative for their competitive survival (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990; Grant, 1996; Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Vermeulen and Varkema, 
2001; Azoulay, 2004). Firms‘ internal research and development (R&D) capabilities 
are often viewed as a critical determinant of their performance (Kogut and Zander, 
1992; Grant, 1996; Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Azoulay, 2004). However, in-house R&D 
is not the only possible source of technological know-how: firms can tap the R&D 
capabilities of competitors, suppliers, and other organizations through contractual 
arrangements such as licenses, collaborations, and joint ventures (Pisano, 1990; 
Vermeulen and Varkema, 2001; Zucker, et al., 2002; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). 
What are the factors that may affect a firm‘s choices between obtaining R&D services 
through acquisitions and through collaborations? This remains one of the central 
questions in the economics of organization and the strategy literature (Pisano, 1990; 
Poppo and Zander; 1998; Leiblein, et al., 2002; Schilling and Steensma, 2002).   
 
R&D procurement decisions are of particular importance for established companies 
confronting critical changes in their core technologies (Pisano, 1990; Powell, et al., 
1996; Zucker, et al., 2002; Schilling and Steensma, 2002). During such gusts of 
creative destruction, established firms‘ research teams may lock-in the conventional 
techniques and lack the technological skills to perform R&D competitively compared 
to new entrants. Boundary decisions have to be made about which new technical 
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capacities to develop internally and which ones to access through collaborative links 
with external sources (Pisano, 1990; Powell, et al., 1996; Nicholson, et al., 2005). 
Moreover, how to manage collaborative relationships that often involve with 
frustrations such as free-riding, appropriation and other contractual hazards represents 
another challenge to firms (Oxley, 1997; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Lerner and Merges, 
1998; Reuter, et al., 2002).  
 
In this dissertation, I examined the contractual arrangements of R&D projects in the 
biopharmaceutical industry. The newly invented biotechnologies such as 
DNA/protein synthesizing and cell fusion have fundamentally changed the 
competitive landscape of the pharmaceutical industry (Powell, et al., 1996; Lerner, et 
al., 2003; Phene, et al., 2006). Such a dramatic technological change provides an 
opportunity to examine how established firms adjust their R&D boundaries to cope 
with the technological uncertainty and how they manage the contractual provisions of 
an R&D partnership (Aghion and Tirole, 1994; Lerner and Merges, 1998; Roijakkers 
and Hagedoorn, 2006). Drawing upon the property right theory, I attempt to address 
these questions in this dissertation.  
 
1.1 Theoretical Perspectives 
 
The boundary choices of firms have attracted much attention from scholars 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991, 2000; Klein, et al., 1978; Grossman and Hart, 1986; 
Holmström and Roberts, 1998; Gibbons, 2005). Two streams of work have made 
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profound impacts on the studies of organization: the Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) based on the works of Williamson (1975, 1979, and 1985) and Klein, 
Crawford, and Alchain (1978); and the Property Right Theory (PRT) began with 
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). 
 
The TCE has emerged as a predominant theoretical perspective in the economics of 
organization during the past three decades (Williamson, 2000; David and Han, 2005; 
Cater and Hodgeson, 2006). Scholars argue and empirically find that the governance 
structure of a transaction is determined largely by the specificity of assets involved in 
a trading relationship (Shelanski and Klein, 1995; David and Han, 2005; Cater and 
Hodgeson, 2006). Asset specificity triggers a threat of opportunistic behaviors that 
requires contractual safeguards to deter. Since those safeguards are costly and are 
often unable to protect trading partners completely, vertical integration may offer a 
preferred governance solution (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Monteverde and Teece, 1982; 
Teece, 1992; Shelanski and Klein, 1995). 
 
Similar to the TCE, the PRT starts with the assumptions that contracts are incomplete 
and investments are relation specific (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 
1990; Hart, 1995). However, while the TCE implicitly assumes that vertical 
integration results in unified management and contains opportunism, the PRT 
maintains that investments and trading decisions remain decentralized in all 
organizational modes (Holmström and Roberts, 1998; Whinston, 2003; Gibbons, 
2005; Garrouste and Saussier, 2005). Transferring ownership from one party to 
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another incurs costs because integration lowers the incentive of the party who loses 
ownership. The low incentive level in turn links to the decision of underinvestment 
since the unified management is assumed away (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and 
Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995). What the PRT is about is to properly allocate property 
rights so that joint surplus is maximized. 
 
In Chapter 2, I reviewed and compared the TCE and the PRT. I argued that the 
integration of two organizations is unlikely to lead to unified management under three 
conditions: A) The knowledge bases of the two parties are remotely related; B) The 
decision-making structures of the two parties are incompatible; and C) The reward 
systems of the two parties are different. Under such circumstances, integration may 
incur significant costs as the merged organization may not be able to properly 
monitor and motivate the party who loses its ownership. The PRT therefore expects 
that trading partners maintain their independence, even when high asset-specificity 
presents.  
 
1.2 Research Setting 
 
In view of the wealth of theoretical literatures of the PRT, it is surprising that only a 
small number of empirical research study the formal structures of transactions from 
this perspective (Williamson, 2000; Whinston, 2003; Gulati, et al., 2005; Baker and 
Hubbard, 2006). In this dissertation, I attempt to fill this gap by examining the 
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boundary choices of a firm from the PRT perspective. I also study how the property 
rights are allocated between alliance partners.    
 
A. The R&D Boundary of a Pharmaceutical Company 
 
A pharmaceutical company can either bring R&D activities ‗in-house‘ by acquiring a 
biotech firm or outsource those activities through inter-firm collaborations. 
Biotechnology R&D projects require highly specialized investments in both physical 
assets and human skills (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Powell, et al., 1996; Yeoh 
and Roth, 1999; Nicholson, et al., 2005). Uncertainty pervades the process of 
discovering, synthesizing, and formulating a therapeutic bioscience-based compound 
(Pisano, 1990; Yeoh and Roth, 1999; Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 2006). Because 
such a project may run for several years, it has more characteristics of a long-term 
recurrent transaction than those of a one-shot exchange (Pisano, 1990; Yeoh and Roth, 
1999). The TCE suggests that integration is required to safeguard the relational-
specific investments in a relationship characterized by high asset-specificity, 
uncertainty, and frequency (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991; Teece, 1989; Pisano, 
1990; Shelanski and Klein, 1995; David and Han, 2004; Carter and Hodgeson, 2006). 
Hierarchy is therefore the preferred organizational form of such R&D projects 
according to the TCE.   
 
However, scholars observed that a majority of R&D projects were administrated by 
inter-firm collaborations rather than integration in the biopharmaceutical industry 
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(Lerner and Merges, 1998; DiMasi, 2000; Nicholson, et al., 2005). For example, 
DiMasi (2000) reported that, from 1997 to 1999, over 70% of all R&D projects in this 
industry were conducted through inter-firm collaborations. Nicholson, et al., (2005) 
reported that of the 391 new chemical entities approved by the FDA between 1983 
and 1999, more than half were discovered by inter-firm collaborations. These 
observations are explicitly at odds with the predictions of the TCE.  
 
In contrast to the TCE, the PRT suggests that the governance structure of a 
transaction is about to balance the benefits and costs of allocating ownership between 
parties so that each party‘ incentive is properly set and the joint economic surplus is 
maximized (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Gibbons, 2005). The 
knowledge base, the decision-making structure, and the reward system of a 
pharmaceutical company and those of its biotech counterpart may differ significantly. 
It is therefore difficult for a pharmaceutical company to effectively monitor and 
motivate its biotech partner after integration. The high costs associated with low 
incentive level of a biotech firm deter a pharmaceutical company from acquiring its 
biotech partner. Under such circumstances, contractual arrangements such as licenses, 
R&D collaborations, and joint ventures may be the favorable choices.  
 
The TCE and the PRT differ in their predictions of the governance structures of less 
mature R&D projects. The technologies covered by an R&D project are frequently in 
the early stages of research exploration. Such less mature projects often involve 
significantly more technological uncertainties than more mature ones. The end-points 
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of those projects and efforts of biotech firms are difficult to specify in an enforceable 
contract. Significant financial supports are required which generates knowledge that 
may not be useful to other applications (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Powell, et al, 
1996; Yeoh and Roth, 1999). The TCE therefore predicts that a pharmaceutical 
company is more likely to internalize those early stage R&D activities (Pisano, 1990). 
However, the research contributions of a biotech firm tend to be particularly critical 
in a less mature project (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Powell, et al, 1996; Lerner, et 
al., 2003). Losing the autonomy in decision-making or changing the market-based 
compensation system of a biotech firm is costly. From a PRT perspective, it may be 
preferable to let the biotech partner remain independent in a transaction involves with 
less mature R&D projects (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Lerner and Merges, 1998). 
 
The predictions of the TCE and the PRT also differ in the governance structures of 
transactions involving biotech firms with a number of R&D projects. Biotech firms 
frequently pursue various R&D projects simultaneously, and not all projects are 
covered by the contract (Pisano, 1990; Lerner and Merges, 1997; Owen-Smith and 
Powell, 2004). Biotech firms are therefore left with leeway to exploit the resources 
contributed by pharmaceutical companies in projects that are not included in a 
contract (Pisano, 1997; Lerner and Merges, 1998; Lerner, et al., 2003). According to 
the TCE, efficiency could be gained by containing such contractual hazards through 
vertical integration. However, as convincingly argued by Henderson and Cockburn 
(1996), there were significant spillover effects between R&D projects within a firm in 
the biopharmaceutical industry. Biotech firms pursuing a number of projects may 
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enjoy the economy of scope and may be significantly more productive than those 
with a handful of projects. Lowering the incentive of such biotech firms by 
acquisition incurs significant costs. Other contractual arrangements such as 
collaborative agreements may therefore be preferred.   
 
The differences in the knowledge bases, the decision-making structures, and the 
reward systems between a pharmaceutical company and its biotech partner may 
significantly affect the cost of integration. When such differences are negligible, a 
pharmaceutical company can monitor the behaviors of its biotech partner. Motivating 
the biotech party is less of a concern. Unified management is likely to archive after 
integration and the costs of integration are reduced. What we observe is therefore 
more likely to be consistent with the predictions of the TCE than with those of the 
PRT. When the differences between the pharmaceutical firm and its biotech partner 
are significant, however, integration is costly since it is difficult for the former to 
monitor and motivate the latter. What we observe is more likely to be consistent with 
the predictions of the PRT than with those of the TCE.  
 
In Chapter 3, I constructed a sample containing 285 biotechnology R&D projects to 
test the predictions of the PRT. My results generally support those predictions. I also 
explored the moderating roles of the knowledge bases, the decision-making structures, 
and the reward systems in Chapter 3.   
 
B. Allocation of Property Rights in Biotech-Pharmaceutical Alliances 
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The allocation of property rights also matters in managing inter-firm R&D 
collaborations between pharmaceutical companies and biotech firms (Aghion and 
Tirole, 1994; Lerner and Merges, 1998; Lerner, et al., 2003). The PRT suggests that 
the property rights of an R&D project should be assigned to the party whose efforts 
critically affect the joint performance. Aghion and Tirole (1994) argued, however, 
that the ex ante bargaining power of trading partners may have a profound impact on 
the allocation of property rights. In the biopharmaceutical industry, financial 
constraints of a biotech firm weaken its bargaining position and induce its 
pharmaceutical partner to inefficiently retain some property rights. A suboptimal 
performance level therefore results (Lerner and Merges, 1998; Lerner, et al., 2003).   
 
In practice, trading partners reveal much more complex interaction patterns than the 
‗one-shot‘ contracts depicted in Grossman and Hart (1986) and Aghion and Tirole 
(1994). Pairs of firms undertake repeated sets of alliances on different topics, and the 
scope and scale of such alliances change over time. Firms engaged in repeated 
relationships know each other better. They are familiar with each other‘s ways of 
doing thing and hence tend to trust each other (Gulati, et al., 1995; Dyer, 1996; Oxley, 
1997; Gulati and Singh, 1998). Moreover, referential information is available through 
a variety of channels such as comments from a third party. When the reputation effect 
is important, firms would concern about how their current behaviors affect their 
future transactions. Socially undesirable behaviors are therefore discouraged (Kreps, 
1990; Raub and Weesie, 1990; Kandori, 1992).  
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Trust and reputation concerns give rise to hand-in-glove agreements through which 
parties reach accommodations when unforeseen events occur (Kogut, et al, 1992; 
Oxley, 1997; Gulati and Singh, 1998). As an example for such an agreement, a 
pharmaceutical company may promise a biotech firm a bonus if the proposed drug 
candidate is successfully delivered. Such a promise is credible only when trust and 
reputation effects are substantial (Kandori, 1992; Baker, et al., 2002). Those informal 
agreements to a certain extent relieve worries of appropriation, and hence substitute 
formal contracts to motivate a party to take initiatives (Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991; 
Baker, et al., 2002). As a result, although the property rights are inefficiently 
allocated, an inter-firm collaboration still stands a chance to be successful (Bull, 1987; 
Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991; Baker, et al., 2002). Thus, partners interacting in a 
social context characterized by high level of trust and strong reputation concerns are 
reluctant to defect from an informal agreement, and the negative impact of the 
misallocation of property rights on alliance performance are mitigated (Baker, et al., 
2002; Nicholson, et al. 2005). 
 
In Chapter 4, I found a significant negative relationship between the ex ante 
bargaining power and the degree of property rights misallocation by examining a 
sample of 222 biotechnology alliances. I also found that the misallocation of property 
rights significantly relates to the early dissolution of an alliance and the slow progress 
of R&D projects. The significances of such correlations are weakened when partners 
share a history of prior interaction or they are embedded in an extensive network 
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characterized by strong reputation effect. I further explored the reasons underlying 
early dissolutions of alliances which carry important implications for both academic 




The theoretical contribution of this thesis is two-fold. First, I clarify the confusion 
surrounding the TCE and the PRT by specifying the situations under which their 
predictions differ significantly. Second, I highlight the importance of considering the 
social contexts when studying the contractual structures of transactions. The 
benevolent social contexts characterized by mutual trust and reputation concerns 
mitigate the negative impact of suboptimal contractual structures on performance.   
 
In this dissertation, I show that the PRT is a data-relevant theory, and can be applied 
to explain a broad range of phenomena. ―[T]heory without evidence is, in the end, 
just speculation.‖ (Masten, 2002:428). The two well-recognized critics to the PRT are 
that a) it makes limited contact with the data; and b) it is a property right and property 
right only theory, which has limited power in explaining phenomena other than 
integration (Williamson, 2000). In this dissertation, I show that the PRT can be tested 
by a structured dataset. Other than integration, I also apply the PRT in issues of 
managing inter-firm collaborations.  
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This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I provide a brief review that 
compares the TCE and the PRT. In Chapter 3, I develop testable hypotheses about the 
R&D boundaries of a pharmaceutical company. I then test those hypotheses in the 
context of the biopharmaceutical industry. In Chapter 4, I study the allocation of 
property rights among alliance partners and its performance implications. Empirical 
tests follow. Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation.   
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Chapter 2 
Transaction Cost Economics and Property Right Theory: An 
Overview 
 
What is a firm?  What determine the boundaries of a firm? These are the central 
questions in the economics of organization (Williamson, 1975; Holmström and 
Roberts, 1998; Gibbons, 2005). Two streams of work have made profound impacts on 
the studies of organization: the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) based on the 
works of Williamson (1975, 1979, and 1985) and Klein, Crawford, and Alchain 
(1978); and the Property Right Theory (PRT) began with Grossman and Hart (1986) 
and Hart and Moore (1990). 
 
Both the TCE and the PRT assume that investments are relation-specific and 
contracts are incomplete (Williamson, 1975; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Holmström 
and Roberts, 1998; Whinston, 2003; Gibbons, 2005). Trading partners are locked in a 
relationship since their specialized investments worth much less in options outside the 
relationship. Contractual incompleteness gives rise to opportunism. As a result, one 
party may holdup the other party to increase her share of the economic rents. Both the 
TCE and the PRT propose that the governance structure of a transaction matters in 
containing the inefficiencies associated with holdups. Some scholars treat the TCE 
and the PRT as one stream of theory with the latter formalizing the former (Shelanski 
and Klein, 1995). Others, however, contend that they are two distinct theories with 
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different empirical implications (Holmström and Roberts, 1998; Williamson, 2000; 
Whinston, 2003; Gibbons, 2005; Garrouste and Saussier, 2005).  
 
Holmström and Roberts (1998) provided the first systematic comparison of the TCE 
and the PRT. They contended that there are certainly points of similarity between 
these two theories, but the detailed logic of them is different, resulting in quite 
different empirical predictions. Whinston (2003) and Gibbons (2005) argued that an 
important difference between the TCE and the PRT is that the former assumes that 
common ownership results in unified management, whereas the latter assumes that 
investment decisions are fundamentally decentralized in all organizational modes. 
While in the TCE opportunism can be contained by bringing the transactions within 
the firm, the PRT maintains that mitigating opportunism by integration is at the cost 
of the party been integrated losing her incentive to invest (Williamson, 2000; 
Whinston, 2003; Gibbons, 2005). In this chapter, I argued that the cost of integration 
is significant in three conditions. First, the knowledge bases of the two parties are 
unrelated. Second, the decision-making structures of the two parties are different. 
Lastly, the reward systems of the two parties are incompatible. Under such 
circumstances, it is difficult for the acquirer to effectively monitor and motivate the 
acquiree. Integration therefore incurs high cost.  
 
In the next section, I discuss the common pre-assumptions of the TCE and PRT—the 
incomplete contract and asset-specificity—and their roles in giving rise to holdups. I 
review the TCE and the PRT respectively in section 2.2 and 2.3. I then specify the 
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differences between the two and try to integrate their predictions by using the concept 
of three organizational contexts: the knowledge bases, the decision-making structures, 
and the reward systems. A review of empirical studies is provided in Section 2.5. 
 
2.1 Incomplete Contract, Relation-Specific Investment, and Holdup 
 
Holdup has been centered in the theory of the firm and both the TCE and the PRT are 
advanced to address this problem. It arises in a relationship when a contract is 
incomplete and relational-specific investments are involved (Shelanski and Klein, 
1995; Holmström and Robert, 1998; Williamson, 2000; Whinston, 2003; Gibbons, 
2005).  
 
Both the TCE and the PRT maintain that in a complex world, contracts are typically 
incomplete since informational complexity constrains the design of contracts and 
agents are ‗intendedly rational, but only limitedly so‘ (Simon, 1961: 204). Some 
actions of an agent may neither be observed nor be verified, making contractual terms 
unenforceable (e.g., see Hart and Moore, 1990 for a discussion of investments on 
human capital; see Aghion and Tirole, 1994 and Tirole, 1999 for a discussion of 
investments in an R&D project). It may be impossible to clearly elicit the behaviors 
of each party in a contract based on only observable and verifiable variables. 
Contracts are then said to be incomplete.  
 
 16 
The presence of relation-specific investments that generate quasi-rents is another 
precondition for holdups (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991; Klein, et al., 1978). 
Relation-specific investments refer to those that will have much lower value in any 
use other than supporting the current transactional relationship. Because it is 
impossible to elicit all ex post contingencies that might affect the division of quasi-
rents, the party who makes the relation-specific investment is subject to holdups: her 
counterparts may ask for a share of the economic surplus that should belong to her, 
and she may have to agree since her investments worth much less in alternative uses. 
Trading partner who commits relation-specific investments thus exposes herself to the 
hazards of opportunistic behaviors in ex post small-number-bargaining: her 
counterparts may try to appropriate the quasi-rents accruing to the specific assets. As 
Masten (1984) put it:  
 
Idiosyncratic assets, because of their specialized and durable nature, imply that parties to 
a transaction face only imperfect exchange alternatives for an extended period. The more 
specialized those assets, the larger will be the quasi-rents at stake over the period, and 
hence the greater the incentive for agents to attempt to influence the terms of trade 
through bargaining or other rent-seeking activities once the investment are in place.  
 
Klein et al. (1978) elaborated the relationship between an automaker and his suppliers 
to illustrate this holdup situation. Suppliers use dies to shape steel into the specific 
forms that fit in a particular car model. These dies often cost millions of dollars, and 
they are next-to-worthless when they are not used in the model. A supplier is then 
vulnerable to holdups since the automaker may take advantage of the fact that the dies 
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can hardly be used elsewhere to force a price reduction and grab some economic 
surplus. Since the original contract is incomplete as the uncertainties with respect to 
the design of a car and market conditions prevent a clear division of economic surplus 
ex ante, a supplier either is unwilling to make a specific die in the first place or have 
to command resources to protect herself from holdups. Inefficiency thus occurs: 
either the arm-length market does not support the optimal level of investments or 
resources are expended on socially wasteful defensive measures.  
 
Both the TCE and the PRT are advanced to address holdups caused by incomplete 
contract and asset specificity. A confusion is emerged that some scholars tend to treat 
the TCE and the PRT as one stream of theory with the latter formalizing the former. 
However, this is not the case. As Holmström and Roberts put it (1998: 75): 
 
Discussions of the holdup problem and its implications for firm boundaries typically list a 
standard string of references — including Williamson (1975, 1985), Klein et al. (1978), 
Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart and Moore (1990) — as if they were the building 
blocks in a single coherent theory of ownership. This is not the case. There are certainly 
points of similarity… But the detailed logic of the stories differs, resulting in quite 
different empirical predictions.  
 
2.2  The Transaction Cost Approach  
 
The TCE is premised on the idea that certain institutional arrangements govern a 
transaction better than others, depending on the characteristics of the transaction in 
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question. It views a firm as a mechanism that coordinates economic activities through 
authority/fiat, in contrast to the arm-length market that coordinates economic 
activities through price mechanism. Hierarchy is superior to market in governing 
transactions plagued by opportunism (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1990; Klein, et al., 
1978). Williamson (1975, 1985) suggested that three transaction characteristics are 
positively related to the adoption of internal governance (i.e., hierarchy): A) the 
condition of asset specificity, B) the degree and the type of uncertainties associated to 
a transaction, C) the frequency that transactions recur.  
 
A. Asset Specificity 
Asset specificity plays a central role in the empirical predictions of the TCE (see 
Joskow, 1988; Shelanski and Klein, 1995; David and Han, 2004; and Carter and 
Hodgson, 2006, for reviews). Relation-specific investments may take the form of 
specialized physical assets (such as a die developed for a particular car model), 
specialized human assets (highly specialized human skills arising in a learning-by-
doing fashion), site specificity (specialization by proximity), dedicated assets (a 
discrete investment that cannot be put to work for other purposes) (Williamson, 1985, 
1999, 2002). Such specialized investments make their owner vulnerable to holdups as 
they are impossible or too costly to switch to alternative uses. As a result, ―value-
preserving governance structures—to infuse order, thereby to mitigate conflict and to 
realize mutual gain—are sought.‖ (Williamson, 2002: 176).  
 
 19 
The TCE predicts that the greater the quasi-rents at stake (i.e., higher level of asset 
specificity), the higher the likelihood of vertical integration should be. Hierarchy is 
often viewed as a nexus of contracts with the components of penalties for premature 
termination, mechanisms for information disclosure and verification, and specialized 
dispute settlement procedures. Investments and trading decisions in an organization 
are thus made in a coordinated manner while disputes are settled through fiat 
(Williamson 1975, 1985, 1991, 1999, 2002). The inefficiency associated with ex post 
small-number-bargaining is contained. As Joskow argued that, ‗[o]ther things equal, 
we expect the parties to more frequently choose vertical integration or a long-term 
contract as the quasi-rents associated with specific investments become more 
important and the associated benefits of precommitment increase.‘ (1988: 103). 
 
B. Uncertainty 
Interesting problems of economic organization arise only in conjunction with 
uncertainty: The ‗economic problem of society is mainly one of adaptation to change 
in particular circumstances of time and place.‘ (Hayek, 1945: 524). A critical 
proposition of the TCE is that the governance structures differ in their capacities to 
respond effectively to disturbances. 
 
Disturbances are not all of a kind. The TCE put a special emphasis on behavioral 
uncertainty which arises because of strategic non-disclosure, disguise, or distortion of 
information (Williamson, 1985, 1990). Uncertainty results in a complex contracting 
environment, in which ex post adaptations are needed after two parties signing a 
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contract, given the presence of specialized investments. As Williamson (1985: 60) 
argued,  
 
Whenever assets are specific in nontrivial degree, increasing the degree of uncertainty 
makes it more imperative that the parties devise a machinery to ―work things out‖—since 
contractual gaps will be larger and the occasions for sequential adaptations will increase 
in number and the importance as the degree of uncertainty increases. Also, and relatedly, 
concerns over the behavioral uncertainties referred to above now intrude.   
 
A hierarchical governance structure assures one party the formal control over both 
sides of a transaction (Williamson, 1975).  It is therefore superior to market exchange 
in resolving potential disputes caused by behavioral uncertainties (Williamson, 1975; 
1985; 1990; Joskow, 1988; Shelanski and Klein, 1995). The underlying assumption is 
that common ownership leads to unified management (Williamson, 2000). Therefore 
the higher the expected behavior uncertainty, the more likely the hierarchy is adopted 
as the favorable governance structure.  
 
C. Frequency  
The frequency of transactions matters because the fixed costs of establishing a 
specialized governance system can be widely spread in a relationship between a pair 
of parties who often interact (Williamson, 1985; Holmström and Roberts, 1998). 
Specialized governance structure is sensitively attuned to the needs of governing 
nonstandard transactions (i.e., transactions involve idiosyncratic assets). But 
specialized structures come at a great cost, and hence the continuity of a relationship 
 21 
matters in determining whether such a cost can be justified. Therefore, the more 
frequent a transaction is, ceteris paribus, the higher the likelihood it will be 
coordinated in a hierarchy (Williamson, 1985).  
 
2.3 The Property Right Approach 
 
One merit of the PRT is that it provides a clear definition of ―ownership‖, that is, the 
residual control rights over an asset. The owner of an asset can decide how an asset is 
used (the essence of residual control rights according to Hart and Moore, 1990), 
subject only to the constraints of the obligations specified in contracts (i.e., 
contractually specified control rights). As Hart (1995: 30n) quoted Oliver W. Holmes:   
 
But what are the rights of ownership? They are substantially the same as those incidents 
to possession. Within the limits prescribed by policy, the owner is allowed to exercise his 
natural powers over the subject-matter uninterfered with, and is more or less protected in 
excluding other people from such interference. The owner is allowed to exclude all, and 
is accountable to no one. 
 
Entitled with the residual control rights of an asset, the owner has the last say when 
unforeseen contingencies force parties to renegotiate. The residual controls give the 
owner bargaining power and become levers that can influence the terms of new 
agreements. Hence, owning more assets guarantees a bigger surplus share and creates 
a stronger investment incentive (Hart, 1995). Under these assumptions, the ownership 
of an asset should belong to the party who can use it most efficiently. However, 
 22 
giving ownership to an agent means taking ownership away from someone else and 
that someone else has lower incentives. Integration therefore inevitably incurs costs 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). The PRT is about to allocate 
ownership so that joint surplus is maximized. 
 
In the PRT, a firm is nothing but a set of assets under common ownership: 
 
if different 
assets have the same owner, then they stand as an integrated firm; if different assets 
have different owners, then they stand as two or more firms (Grosssman and Hart, 
1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). Grossman and Hart (1986) invoked asset specificity 
and implicitly turned on bounded rationality and opportunism in an incomplete 
contracting setup. They assumed that the ex ante investments from each party are 
made independently and the ex post renegotiation is costless. The expected payoff for 
each party is her opportunity cost (i.e., her go-alone value) plus a share of the 
economic surplus generated by the transaction.  
 
In Grossman and Hart‘s (1986) model, each party makes two sets of decisions: ex 
ante investment decisions (a) and, after state-of-the-world realizations obtain, ex post 
operating decisions (q). Examples of a include a manager‘s efforts in acquiring the 
skills of setting up a well-functioning firm (Grossman and Hart, 1986), or a chef‘s 
efforts in acquiring skills of preparing a particular cuisine (Hart and Moore, 1990). 
Such efforts are too complex to be clearly described, thus they are unlikely to be 
contractible ex ante. The operation decisions q represent rights of controlling an asset 
(i.e., the residual control), which can be purchased.  
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Investment decisions remain fundamentally decentralized in Grossman and Hart‘s 
(1986) model, as investments (as) are made independently and non-cooperatively 
regardless of the ownership structure. Full optimality being unavailable (the first best 
result requires as to be made coordinately), the question is which assignments of qs 
among relevant parties perform better. The answer is intuitive, that the ownership (all 
qs) should be assigned to the party whose a has higher marginal efficiency compared 
to her counterparts.
1
 Since ex post renegotiations are costless and qs are made in a 
coordinated manner after integration, the profits generated by the relationship mostly 
depend on as. The party whose investments (a) have higher marginal efficiency will 
therefore maximize her investments, and this comes only at the cost of reducing her 
counterpart‘s investments. This trade-off determines the efficient boundaries of a firm. 
Not only integration or non-integration matters, but who integrates whom furthermore 
matters.  
 
The PRT yields a unified theory of vertical integration in an incomplete contract 
setting. As summarized by Gibbons (2005), whereas the TCE ―is silent about internal 
organization, an important feature of the property-rights theory is not only that it 
defines and evaluates life under integration, but also that it does so for the same 
                                                 
1
 In Grossman and Hart (1986), joint ownership and outsider ownership are extremely 
unlikely to be optimal. However, later developments of the PRT suggest that joint 
ownership may be desirable when investments improve contractible assets (e.g., Hart 
and Moore, 1990) or when parties interact repeatedly (e.g, Halonen, 2002), and third-
party control can also be desirable if parties would otherwise invest too much in 
improving their outside opportunities to strengthen their bargaining positions 
(Holmström and Tirole, 1991; Holmström and Milgrom, 1991, 1994; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998). A more precise statement therefore is that holdups can be contained 
by properly allocating the ownership between parties.  
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environment for which it defined and evaluated life under non-integration. Without 
this feature, the property-rights theory could not provide a unified account of the costs 
and benefits of integration.‖  
 
2.4 An Attempt to Integrate TCE and PRT 
 
Although both the TCE and the PRT are based on the premises of incomplete contract 
and opportunism, they differ in many ways (Holmström and Roberts, 1998; 
Williamson, 2000; Whinston, 2003; Gibbons, 2005; Garrouste and Saussier, 2005). 
Holmström and Roberts (1998) provided the first systematic comparison between the 
two and argued that they differ in at least four aspects. First, The TCE focuses on 
socially destructive appropriation of ex post quasi-rents and assumes contractible 
specific investments ex ante, whereas the PRT assumes efficient ex post bargaining 
and focuses on inefficiencies of ex ante investments. Second, in the TCE the implicit 
measure of asset specificity is the aggregate level of quasi-rents, whereas in the PRT 
the payoff of each party is its go-alone value plus its share of quasi-rents. Third, the 
TCE treats the market as a default superior to the hierarchy, whereas the PRT does 
not assume such a default. Last, the uncertainty and the frequency play no role in the 
PRT but are important determinants of organizational modes in the TCE.  
 
Echoed with Holmström and Roberts (1998), Williamson contended that ‗the most 
consequential difference between the TCE and GHM [Grossman-Hart-Moore] setups 
is that the former holds that maladaptation in the contract execution interval is the 
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principal source of inefficiency, whereas GHM vaporize ex post maladaptation by 
their assumption of common knowledge and costless bargaining.‘ (2000: 605). He 
also argued that the TCE was substantially supported by empirical studies, while such 
support was rare for the PRT. Moreover, the TCE has been applied to examine a wide 
range of organizational forms (e.g., hybrids, mutual hostages, organizations of labor 
and human resources, corporate governance, regulation/deregulation, public bureaus, 
and project financing), while the PRT is a property right and property right only 
theory (Williamson, 2000).  
 
Holmström and Roberts (1998) and Williamson (2000) concluded that although the 
PRT has long been considered a formalization of the TCE, it is clearly not the case: 
the detailed logic of the stories differs, resulting in quite different empirical 
predictions. Whinston (2003) and Gibbons (2005) maintained that such empirical 
distinctions are created by the different implicit assumptions: the TCE assumes that 
integration can stop the haggling induced by appropriable quasi-rents, but the PRT 
does not.    
 
Gibbons (2005) argued that the empirical predictions of the TCE are flawed because 
this theory focuses on the benefits of integration but fails to clearly include a 
downside of integration. Therefore, it gives no insight of whether integration could 
ever be ―the greater of two evils‖ (i.e., inefficient haggling vs. integration cost). 
According to him, one of the key contributions of the PRT is that it gives a unified 
account of the costs and the benefits of integration. In the PRT, integrating asset 
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ownership changes incentives, but does not result in coordinated investments as in the 
TCE. Therefore, one downside of integration is the reduced incentive to invest for the 
acquired party. For example, having an automaker acquire its supplier may stop 
inefficient haggling over appropriable quasi-rents, but the acquisition may also create 
the possibility that the supplier exerts little efforts and free-rides on the automaker.  
 
Similarly, Whinston (2003) pointed out that an important difference between the TCE 
and the PRT is that the former assumes that common ownership results in unified 
management, whereas the latter assumes that investment decisions are fundamentally 
decentralized in all organizational modes. Hence, in the PRT, the integration decision 
involves a comparison of the efficiency costs of opportunism in the various possible 
organizational modes. He took a close look at the empirical distinctions of the TCE 
and the PRT and concluded that, ―in the PRT, only marginal returns to investments 
matter for the integration decision. This stands in contrast to the TCE, in which it is 
levels of quasi-rents that matter for integration decisions.‖ (2001: 185). As such, the 
extensive empirical research geared to testing Williamson‘s three-factor framework 
casts no light on the PRT models. 
 
As correctly observed by Whinston (2003) and Gibbons (2005) among many others, 
in practice, holdups associated with specialized investments often do not lead to 
integration. The TCE may have difficulties in explaining these observations, which 
seem to fall into the story-telling of the PRT: as common ownership will not result in 
unified management, intra-organization inefficiency is possible. Non-integration may 
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therefore be preferable even in the presence of specialized investments since it may 
be more costly for the acquired party to lose its incentive than the haggling costs 
(Holmström and Roberts, 1998; Whinston, 2003; Gibbons, 2005; Garrouste and 
Saussier, 2005).  
 
I argue that the common ownership is unlikely to lead to unified management and the 
empirical implications between the TCE and the PRT are significant under three 
conditions: A) The knowledge bases of the two parties are remotely unrelated; B) The 
decision-making structures of the two parties are incompatible; and C) The reward 
systems of the two parties are different.  
 
A. Remotely Related Knowledge bases 
 
There are many types of knowledge relevant to a firm; some are explicit and 
describable, others are tacit in nature (Grant, 1996; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Hauffman, 
et al., 2000). The tacitness posits a great challenge to assimilate the newly acquired 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1992; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Hauffman, et al., 
2000).  
 
To integrate certain classes of complex technological knowledge into a firm‘s 
activities, the firm requires an existing internal staff of scientists who are both 
competent in their fields and familiar with the new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1992; Grant, 1996; Hauffman, et al., 2000). When the acquired and acquiring firms 
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come from distant realms of technologies, the recipes for conducting research and 
their organizational routines are likely to be different (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Dyer 
and Singh, 1998). Under such circumstances, the communications between the two 
parties are ineffective and mutual understanding is limited because of the differences 
in language, pathway of communications, and cognitive routines of learning between 
the two organizations (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). The 
integration of knowledgebase therefore can be resource consuming, or even 
counterproductive as the disruption of existing operational routines brings frustration, 
distrusts, and low loyalty to the new organization (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; 
Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Zollo and Singh, 2004).  It is therefore difficult for the 
acquirer to effectively monitor and motivate the acquiree after integration.  
 
Consider the case of Schlumberger acquiring Fairchid Semiconductor. Schlumberger, 
primarily an oil service company, was in a stable technological environment. 
Fairchild was involved in an extremely dynamic technological environment where the 
importance of R&D could not be overestimated. After integration, the new 
organization was unable to put technical teams together because of the discontinuity 
in their knowledge bases. The integration was doomed when Schlumberger felt 
frustrated and tried to manage Fairchild the same way it had managed its own R&D 
units. Limited resources were provided to the R&D activities in Fairchild, with the 
consequences of losing the technical edge that Fairchild once had. Creative and 
talented technical personnel left the organization. In 1997 Fairchild Semiconductor 
was reborn as an independent company. 
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B. Incompatible Decision-Making Structures  
 
Integration is unlikely to lead to unified management when the acquirer and the 
acquiree have incompatible decision-making structures. Decision-making has been 
described as an element of the managerial cultures of an organization (Chatterjee, 
1992; Pablo, 1994; Schweiger and Goulet 2005). It reflects the level of hierarchical 
control, the management‘s attitude towards risks, and the preferred communication 
patterns (Datta, 1991; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). While some firms rely heavily 
on common sense, gut feelings, and rules of thumb, others emphasize formalized 
strategic planning systems, market survey, and other ―scientific‖ management 
techniques (Datta, 1991; Chatterjee, 1992; Vermeulen and Varkema, 2001).  It is not 
uncommon to find that operations or plans which seem to be reckless and extremely 
risky to one firm appear to be justifiable approaches to another firm. 
 
Since the coexistence of two incompatible decision-making routines in one 
organization is virtually infeasible, it inevitably raises the issue of imposing the 
dominant style into the newly acquired organization in an attempt to integrate. This 
attempt gives rise to increasing anxiety, distrust, and conflict, with declining 
productivity and poor performance (Ivancevich, et al., 1987; Datta, 1991; Pablo, 1994; 
Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). Ensuing conflicts result in a loss of direction and low 
moral among acquired firm personnel. Schweiger et al. (1991) argued that the 
acquisition announcements between firms with distinct decision-making structures 
increase stress and absenteeism while reduce job satisfaction, commitment, and 
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perceptions about organization‘s trustworthiness. Vermeulen and Varkema (2001) 
found that major differences in decision-making styles and philosophies are serious 
impediments to achieve acquisition success. 
 
An example of clashing decision-making structures is the failed merger of Rolm and 
IBM. Rolm Company epitomized the small, fast-growing companies in the Silicon 
Valley, projecting a relaxed corporate culture but maintaining a sense of mission. 
There were no fixed working hours or dress codes; personal communication and 
mutual understanding were the norms. To maintain the small company atmosphere, 
Rolm subdivided its operations into many divisions, with separate divisions selling to 
specific markets like banking, education, government, health care, hotel/motel, and 
retail.  
 
At the beginning, IBM was welcomed by the key personnel of Rolm to invest in its 
operations and eventually to become full owner of Rolm. Although IBM declared that 
it would exercise a hands-off policy in managing Rolm, problems soon surfaced. The 
attempt to integrate the subdivisions of Rolm with overlapping operations of IBM 
resulted in chaos. The uniform price policy of IBM replaced the flexible price policy 
of Rolm and dampened the moral of Rolm‘s sales force. Rolm‘s co-founder Kenneth 
Oshma had quit, triggering a wave of resigns in the executive teams. Eventually, IBM 
divested Rolm. 
 
C. Different Reward Systems 
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The reward systems provide incentives for agents within an organization (Datta, 1991; 
Lane, et al., 2002). Such systems vary significantly across organizations, with some 
adopt highly leveraged performance bonus (e.g., stock options, commissions, and 
other profits sharing plans) while others rely on bureaucratic modes (e.g., fixed salary, 
pension, benefits plans, and insurances). Differences in evaluations exist along a 
number of factors such as the time period on which the evaluation is focused (short-
term vs. long-term), the indices used to measure performance (objective vs. 
subjective), and the type of performance indicator used in the evaluation process 
(accounting-based vs. market-based) (Datta, 1991; Schweiger, et al., 2001; Lane, et 
al., 2002).  
 
With reward systems representing an important vehicle to motivate employees, 
merging different systems in an attempt to integrate are likely to elicit strong 
reactions. The issue of dysfunctional imposition of the dominant systems into the 
newly acquired organizations has been viewed as the outcome of two forces, namely, 
the defensive behaviors of the acquired party and the arrogant attitude of the 
acquiring firm (Datta, 1991; Schweiger, et al., 2001; Lane, et al., 2002). The former 
stems from unfamiliarity with each other‘s reward procedures, while the latter is the 
outcome of an erroneous belief among the acquiring firm‘s management that their 
systems are superior to those of the acquired entity. The outcomes of defensiveness 
and arrogance are detrimental: the feeling of being betrayed or exploited will cause 
employees to shirk, or sometimes to leave the merged organization (Datta, 1991; 
Schweiger, et al., 2001; Lane, et al., 2002). Dissimilarities in reward systems between 
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the acquiring and the acquired firms can be an important impediment to unify the 
management after integration.  
 
Take the merger of Rolm and IBM as an example. Salespeople of Rolm have the 
autonomy to offer different deals to different customers while their earnings largely 
depend on commission. After the acquisition, IBM soon found that it was subjected to 
pressures from its original salespeople: Were Rolm salespeople to be paid a higher 
commission than IBM people even when selling to the same clients? IBM responded 
by raising base salaries and reducing the rate of commission. The lower commission 
rates had the largest effect on the best salespeople from Rolm. Some of them quit. 
Rolm engineers, previously motivated by stock options in Rolm Corporation, were 
now given stock options in IBM instead. Although their successes in developing a 
new product could make a substantial difference in Rolm‘s stock price, not much they 
could do to affect the value of IBM‘s stock. Performance incentives were muted.  
 
In summary, when two parties have different knowledge bases, decision-making 
structures, and reward systems, it is difficult for the acquirer to effectively monitor 
and motivate the acquiree. Unified management is difficult to archive after integration. 
The PRT predicts that parties may maintain their independence under such conditions, 
even when high asset-specificity presents, since integration may be costly. This 








The TCE predicts that the hierarchy is the preferred governance structure when a 
transaction is characterized by high asset-specificity, uncertainty, and frequency 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1990). Empirical tests of those predictions got under way in 
the 1980s and have grown exponentially since (Williamson, 2000; David and Han, 
2004; Carter and Hodgeson, 2006). According to David and Han (2004), 
Williamson‘s 1975 and 1985 books, two of the landmark pieces in the TCE, have 
been garnering anywhere between 250 to 500 citations yearly since the early 1990s. 
Given the massive attention that the TCE has received, it is impossible for me to give 
an exhaustive review here. I therefore focus on a number of influential and highly 




The results of these studies are summarized in Table 2.1. It is striking that all studies 
found some support for the role of asset specificity playing in the vertical integration 
decision. This conclusion concurs with David and Han (2004: 52), who found that 
asset specificity fared best as a significant independent variable in their study. The 
findings associated with uncertainties are mixed, while transaction frequency is often 
omitted in empirical studies. It is also significant that few studies tested the rival 
                                                 
2
 See Joskow (1988), Shelanski and Klein (1995), Lyons (1995), Rindfleisch and 
Heide (1997), David and Han (2004), and Carter and Hodgson (2006) for reviews of 
empirical studies of the TCE.  
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approaches such as the PRT alongside the TCE, and the three exceptions include 
Spiller (1985; the TCE vs. market-power theory), Popper and Zenger (1998; a 
comparison of the TCE, the PRT, and the knowledge-based view of the firm), and 
Schilling and Steensma (2002; the TCE vs. resource-based view of the firm). For the 
purpose of this dissertation, below I consider two categories of empirical phenomena 
explained by the TCE: the boundary choices of a firm and the ―hybrid‖ contracting 
modes. 
 
The Boundary Choices of a Firm Monteverde and Teece (1982) made one of the 
first efforts to test the predictions of the TCE. They developed an index measuring the 
degree of engineering effort involved in the production for each of the 133 
automobile components. Proxies are also included for whether the component is 
specific to the manufacturer or is generic to all manufactures. Their thesis is that 
―[t]he greater is the applications engineering effort associated with the development 
of any given automobile component, the higher are the expected appropriable quasi-
rents and, therefore, the greater is the likelihood of vertical integration of production 
for that component‖ (207). Coding the dependent variable as either make or buy for 
each component, they found that, consistent with the TCE, both the engineering effort 




Table 2.1 Empirical Studies Testing the TCE 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent variables 
Industry Results 
Asset Specificity Uncertainty Frequency 
Anderson (1985) Integrated or 
independent sales force  
 Knowledge about 
customer 
relationship 
 Knowledge about 
specific products 
 







Anderson (1988) Integrated or 
independent sales force 
 Knowledge about 
customer 
relationship 
 Customer loyalty 














independent sales force 
 Knowledge about 
customer 
relationship 
 Customer loyalty 
 Environmental 
unpredictability  




















Coles and Hesterly 
(1998) 
Outsource vs. 





 Coordination cost 
 Performance 
evaluation 
 Technological change 







Table 2.1 Empirical Studies Testing the TCE (Cont.) 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent variables 
Industry Results 
Asset Specificity Uncertainty Frequency 
Gatignon and 
Anderson (1988) 
Percentage of Equity  Sales adjusted R&D 
expenditure 
 Sales adjusted 
advertising 
expenditure 







John and Weitz 
(1988) 
Percentage of sales 
through direct channel 
 Time required for 
new hire to become 
familiar 
 
 Time from initial 
contact o order 
placement 
 Stability of market 
share 
 Easiness to monitor 
trends 
 Stability of industry 
volume 









Jones (1987)  Number of 
supervisory level 
 Span of control 






 How frequent 
a transaction 
is 





Klein, Frazier, and 
Roth (1990) 
Integration vs. hiring 
local distributors 
 Difficulties of 
learning product 





 Volatility of retailers 
and wholesalers 
 Predictability of 
customer reactions 























 ex ante number of suppliers 
 Specificity of the asset 
exchanged 
 






with the TCE 
Levy (1985) Ratio of value added 
to sales 
 Industry concentration 
 Intensity of R&D 
 Intensity of advertising 
 
 Anticipated future 
demand growth 
 Unanticipated 
variance in sales 










Whether a firm 
manufactures 
its primary chemical 
input 
 Supplier concentration 
 Total fixed investment 
 Liquidity of input 
 Cost of input 
 
 Demand uncertainty n/a Chemicals Partly 
consistent with 
the TCE 
Lyons (1995) Make or buy  Investments in specialized 
equipments 
 






Mang (1998) Transfer option 
(market vs. alliance) 
 Number of competing 
projects 
 Number of competing 
firms 
 Knowledge specificity 
 








Masten et al. 
(1989) 
Percentage of the 
components produced 
 Technical know-how 
 Specific physical assets 
 Site specificity 
 










Asset Specificity Uncertainty Frequency 
Michael (1994) Mail order vs. 
retail stores 
 Cost of physical 
distribution 
 Cost of information 
 
 Describablility of the 
product 
n/a Retailing  Consistent 




fabrication or not 
 Maturity of the 
technological knowledge 





with the TCE 
Monteverde and 
Teece (1982) 
Make vs. buy 
certain components 
 Engineering efforts  
 Specific vs. generic 
components 
n/a n/a Auto  Consistent 
with the TCE 
Oxley (1997) Level of 
hierarchical control 
 Transaction type   Technological scope 
 Geographic scope 











 Switching costs 
 Applications customer-
tailored to buyers 
 Time required to acquire 
knowledge about a firm  
 
 Speed of human skills 
updating  











 Product category-specific 
assets 
 Demand uncertainty 
 Technological uncertainty 











 Uniqueness of 
technology 
 Barriers to imitation 
 Technological uncertainty 


















n/a  Threat of opportunism 
 Threat of commercial 
failure 













 Technology novelty 
 Expected resale value 











Make or buy 
components 
 Competitiveness of 
quotes 
 Number of suppliers 
 Supplier proprietary 
technology 
 Expected volume 
fluctuation  
 Uncertainty of volume 
estimation 
 Frequency of technology 
improvement 
 Changes in technological 
specification 






Make or buy 
components 
n/a  Expected volume 
fluctuation 
 Uncertainty of volume 
estimation 
 Frequency of technology 
improvement 
 Changes in technological 
specification 





Other studies of component procurement decisions in the auto industry found similar 
evidence. Walker and Weber (1984) focused on uncertainty as a determinant of 
vertical integration. They found that greater uncertainty about production volume 
increased the probability that a component was made in-house. But the technological 
uncertainty measured by the frequency of changes in product specification has little 
effect. In a further refinement, Masten, Meehan, and Snyder (1989) compared the 
relative importance of relationship-specific human and physical capital in 
determining the firm boundary. They found that engineering effort, as a proxy for 
human asset specificity, appeared to affect the integration decision more than physical 
or site specificity did.  
 
Besides backward integration into component supply, scholars also found supports 
for the TCE in studies of forward integration into marketing and distribution. 
Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) considered two marketing alternatives for an 
electronics component producer: using employees as direct sales forces (integration) 
vs. relying on independent representatives (non-integration). The authors regressed a 
firm‘s boundary choices on managers‘ perceptions of asset specificity, sales volume 
uncertainty, and measurement uncertainty. Each of these variables was predicted to 
increase the likelihood of a direct sales force. They found that specific human capital 
and measurement uncertainty are significantly related to integration. However, the 
sales uncertainty is insignificant. A second study by Anderson (1985), also on the 
electronics industry, found similar results, as did John and Weitz (1988) using data 
from a variety of manufacturing industries. 
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Except for John and Weitz (1988), all empirical studies cited above focused on a 
particular industry. There are some cross-sectional studies on transactional 
determinants of vertical integration using multi-industry data. An early effort by Levy 
(1985) used the ratio of value-added to sales as a cross-industry measure of vertical 
integration, the number of firms and amount of R&D spending as measures of asset 
specificity, and the variance of sales as a measure of uncertainty. Using data from 69 
firms representing 37 industries for the years 1958, 1963, 1967, and 1972, he found 
that both asset specificity and uncertainty have a statistically significant effect on 
vertical integration. 
 
In a cross-sectional setting, Spiller (1985) examined site specificity in an attempt to 
distinguish between the TCE and market-power explanations for vertical integration. 
While the TCE predicts that the gains from merger are increasing in the degree of 
asset specificity, market-power considerations suggest that the gains are increasing in 
the degree of supplier-market concentration. Using site specificity, defined as the 
proximity of the merging firms, to represent asset specificity, Spiller studied the gains 
from merger according to the abnormal returns to the firms‘ stock prices after the 
announcement of the merger. He found that the total gains from mergers are smaller 
the greater the distance between the merging firms (the lower the site specificity), 
whereas the industry concentration ratio has no significant effect. This appears to 
support the asset-specificity explanation over the market-power explanation. 
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Some studies, however, found evidence that is inconsistent with the predictions of the 
TCE. Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt‘s (1986) results indicate a correlation between 
asset specificity (albeit measured very indirectly) and vertical integration. They also 
tested for what they defined as technological uncertainty and found that it is 
negatively related to vertical integration. This finding is inconsistent with the TCE. 
The study of foreign market entry modes by Erramilli and Rao (1993) found mixed 
results for uncertainty. They tested the interaction effect between asset specificity and 
uncertainty. They found support for an external interaction and argued that such a 
finding is consistent with Williamson‘s TCE framework. By contrast, they found no 
support for an internal uncertainty interaction, which is inconsistent with the TCE. 
They also tested for uncertainty effects directly and found no correlation between 
external uncertainty and the forms of entry modes. However, they found a negative 
relationship between internal uncertainty and full control entry mode, which again 
was inconsistent with Williamson‘s framework. 
 
Gatignon and Anderson‘s (1988) found that the asset specificity variable taken alone 
is positively correlated with vertical integration. However, again the study presented 
mixed findings for uncertainty variables, with external uncertainty being found to 
have an inverse relationship with vertical integration. Also, and consistent with 
Erramilli and Rao (1993), the authors noted that, even at low levels of asset 
specificity, integration seems to be a preferred option. 
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Hybrid Organization. Compared with vertical integration, there is less of a 
consensus over the natures and the causes of hybrid relationships (Cater and Hodgson, 
2006). Many empirical researchers regard the understanding of hybrid relationships 
as a major challenge, and propose that Williamson‘s framework is inadequate to this 
task (Hodgson, 2002; Cater and Hodgson, 2006). The empirical work on hybrid forms 
involves a highly eclectic range of studies, with less emphasis on directly testing the 
predictions of the TCE.  
 
Pisano (1990) asked why firms rely on equity linkages instead of contracts to support 
certain transactions. He tested the following hypotheses: (i) equity linkages are more 
likely when R&D activities are performed during collaborations; (ii) equity 
arrangements are more likely when collaborations encompass multiple projects; and 
(iii) equity arrangements are less likely in environments in which there are more 
potential collaborators. He found support for each of the three hypotheses using data 
from 195 collaborative arrangements in the biotechnology industry. Pisano, Russo, 
and Teece (1988) applied a similar approach to the telecommunication equipment 
business and found that the TCE can explain the choices between equity linkages and 
other forms of cooperative ventures (consortiums, or non-equity linkages). 
 
Oxley (1997) shifted the focus from asset specificity to what she called ―a more 
general class of contractual hazards‖—appropriability. In alliances that are designed 
to govern cooperative efforts in the exploitation of technology, partners must beware 
of the leakage of valuable intellectual property. Oxley‘s thesis is that more 
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hierarchical alliance types are chosen when appropriability hazards (i.e., the potential 
knowledge leakage) are severe. The degree of appropriability was measured by 
technology scope, geographic scope, and the number of partners of an alliance. 
Strong support was found by analyzing 165 alliances established from 1980 to 1989.  
 
Gulati and Singh (1998) included another kind of transaction costs, the coordination 
costs, in their analysis of the governance structures of alliances. The coordination 
costs arise from interdependent tasks and the complexity of inter-firm activities. 
Following the TCE, they argued that the coordination costs and the appropriation 
concerns (or appropriability hazards in Oxley‘s terminology) are positively related to 
the adoption of equity alliances, which are more hierarchical than non-equity ones. 
Gulati and Singh examined the announcements of 1,570 alliances in the automotive, 
the new material, and the biopharmaceutical industries to assess the choice of alliance 
types. Their findings suggested that the magnitude of hierarchical controls in alliances 
was positively influenced by the anticipated coordination costs and by the expected 
appropriation concerns.  
 
In summary, I highlight three features of the empirical tests of the TCE. First, 
alternate hypotheses that could also fit the data are rarely tested in those studies, but 
usually the data are only found consistent or inconsistent with the hypotheses (based 
on the TCE) at hand (Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Cater and Hodgson, 2006). I believe 
that there is a need for studies that explicitly compare competing, observationally 
distinct hypotheses about contractual relationships to those of the TCE, because rival 
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theories commonly posit mutually exclusive outcomes. One example of exceptions is 
Spiller‘s (1985) comparison of the asset-specificity explanation and the market-power 
theory for vertical merger. Another prototype for such a study might be Poppo and 
Zenger‘s (1998) comparison of the TCE, the knowledge-based theory of the firm, and 
the measurement arguments. Schilling and Steensma (2002) tested both the TCE and 
the resource-based determinants of the organizational modes. While the TCE 
determinants showed significant power in explaining the governance modes, the 
resource-based determinants failed to do so. Further studies of this kind are essential 
for a better understanding of organizations. 
 
Second, the empirical studies of hybrid organizations often take that Williamson‘s 
treatment of hybrids as inadequate (Hodgson, 2002; Cater and Hodgson, 2006). The 
initial concerns are therefore to further develop a theoretical framework and then 
submit it to empirical test. Many of these models do not correspond directly to the 
TCE, and require some interpretations to identify any implications for Williamson‘s 
theory (Hodgson, 2002; Cater and Hodgson, 2006). 
 
Third, the empirical studies aiming to test the TCE tell us little about the PRT 
(Whinston, 2003). Take Monteverde and Teece (1986) as an example, the cost of 
integration is absent: Do the externally produced components base on technologies 
related to the knowledge base of an automaker? Do the decision-making structures or 
reward systems of suppliers differ significantly to those of the automakers, so that the 
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integration can be costly? All above questions remain unanswered, but carry 




Compared to the TCE which is considered as ―an empirical success story‖ 
(Williamson, 2000:605), the PRT makes limited contact with the data (Whinston, 
2003; Gulati, 2005). This is at least partly because the predictions of the PRT is based 
on the comparison of the marginal efficiency of each party‘s investments, which is 
difficult to quantify (Whinston, 2003; Gibbons, 2005). A few exceptions include 
Baker and Hubbard (2006), Windsperger and Dant (2006), Woodruff (2002), Lerner 
and Merges (1998), and Elfenbein and Lerner (2003). Below, I reviewed those 
empirical studies according to the phenomena they try to explain: the boundary 
choices and the hybrids.   
 
The Boundary Choices of a Firm Baker and Hubbard (2006) studied the allocation 
of property rights in the trucking industry by developing an analytic framework that 
drew heavily on Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). A logistics 
company can either hire independent truck drivers (owner-operators) or develop its 
truck fleet in-house (company drivers). Independent drivers often drive in a way that 
better preserves the truck‘s value. However, the individual responsible for planning 
how trucks should be used (the dispatcher) does not have an incentive to get owner-
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operator a better deal: she may under-invest in finding good ―backhauls‖ (return trips) 
for trucks owned by drivers.  
 
Baker and Hubbard‘s (2006) empirical analyses were three-fold. First, they found that 
driver ownership of trucks was greater for longer hauls, and for hauls that were 
unidirectional (i.e., no backhauls) rather than bidirectional. They then examined how 
the installation of the on-board computers (OBC) that became available in the middle 
of the sample period affected ownership patterns. The OBC reduced the monitoring 
costs. Driver ownership decreased with the adoption of the OBC. Finally, they 
examined how the OBC changed the way drivers drove and found that fuel economy 
was better for trucks with the OBC than those without it. All these findings are 
consistent with the predictions of the PRT  
 
Windsperger and Dant (2006) tested the predictions of the PRT in the context of 
franchising relationships. They argued that the marginal efficiency of intangible 
assets plays a dominate role in determining the optimal ownership structures. 
Intangible assets such as skills and know-how largely stored in the mind of 
individuals and cannot be readily transferred to other agents. The franchisee‘s 
intangible assets refer to the outlet-specific know-how in quality control, human 
resource management, local advertising, customer services, and product innovation. 
The franchisor‘s intangible assets refer to knowledge and skills in site selection, store 
layout, procurement, and brand name establishment. A franchisee possesses 
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substantial ownership stake if its intangibles are more important in generating 
incomes than those of a franchiser‘s and vice versa.  
 
Windsperger and Dant (2006) measured the Franchisor’s intangibles by ―annual 
training days‖: the longer the time required to face-to-face interaction, the more 
knowledge transferred from the franchisor to the franchisee, the more important were 
the franchisor‘s intangibles. The Franchisee’s intangibles were measured by survey 
questions indicating its capabilities of innovation, marketing, quality control, and 
administration. By studying 85 franchise chains, they found that the Franchisor’s 
intangibles were positively related to the choice of integration as predicted by the 
PRT. However the results associated with the Franchisee’s intangibles are mixed: 
The franchisee‘s capabilities of innovation and marketing were positively related to 
the choice of integration, which was opposite to the predictions of the PRT; the 
franchisee‘s capabilities of quality control and administration show the expected sign 
but were insignificant. They argued that this may be because innovation and 
marketing activities are contractible but quality control and administration activities 
are not.  
 
Woodruff (2002) examined patterns of integration among manufacturers and retailers, 
using data from a survey of footwear manufacturers in Mexico. Footwear 
manufacturers must make non-contractible investments which affect the quality of the 
goods produced. Retailers make efforts to provide better services for customers and to 
learn the tastes of their customers. The importance of investments made by the two 
 49 
managers varies according to the heterogeneity of goods produced, the quality of 
materials used in production, and the rate at which fashions change. In the first two 
cases, both the TCE and the PRT predict same pattern of integration (i.e., the higher 
the heterogeneity, the higher the quality of materials, the more likely the integration 
is). However, with respect to the increases in the rate of fashion-turnover, the TCE 
predicts higher propensity of integration but the PRT predicts the opposite. The data 
indicated that integration is less frequent when fashion-turnover is more rapid, 
suggesting that the PRT did a better job of explaining the patterns of integration than 
the TCE did.  
 
Hybrid Organizations. Lerner and Merges (1998) examined the allocation of control 
rights in alliances between a biotech firm and its sponsors through three case studies 
and an analysis of 200 biotechnology alliances. They first specified 25 types of 
control rights which were defined as ‗the right to make decisions about issues that 
cannot be contractually specified.‘ (1998: 125). As a biotech firms‘ efforts are critical 
for the success of delivering a new product, Lerner and Merges argued that those 
control rights should be allocated to a biotech firm to enhance its incentives, 
especially when an R&D project is at the early stage of development. They measured 
the bargaining power of a biotech firm by its financial strength: the greater the 
financial strength of it, the less dependent it is on the sponsors‘ financial support. 
They found that the greater the ex ante bargaining power of the biotech firm, the more 
control rights were assigned to it. Elfenbein and Lerner (2003) checked a set of 
similar hypotheses in the context of internet portal alliances. The authors examined 
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how 12 key control rights were assigned in 106 alliances between internet portals and 
other firms, and found partial support to the PRT.    
 
In Chapter 3, I compared the TCE and the PRT in the context of the 
biopharmaceutical industry. On the one hand, biotechnology R&D projects involve 
specialized investments and they are highly uncertain. On the other hand, the supply 
of bioscience-based drug-discovery technologies is limited, and the personal skills of 
the star scientists are critical for the success of an R&D project (Pisano, 1990; Arora 
and Gambardella, 1990; Lerner and Merges, 1998; Yeoh and Roth, 1999; Nicholson, 
et al., 2005). Moreover, rich information is available for those projects. The 
biopharmaceutical industry therefore provides a convenient context to examine the 




The R&D Boundaries of the Firm: The Case of Biopharmaceutical Industry 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Pharmaceutical companies can either outsource their R&D activities through inter-
firm collaborations, or develop new drugs in-house (Powell, et al., 1996; Lerner and 
Merges, 1998; Nicholson, Danzon and McCullough, 2005). According to the 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), as R&D activities in the biopharmaceutical 
industry are highly proprietary and subject to market imperfections, integration is 
preferred (Williamson, 1985, 1991; Shelanski and Klein, 1995). However, the 
Property Right Theory (PRT) suggests that integration may be costly because the 
party who loses the property rights loses initiatives as well (Grossman and Hart, 1986; 
Hart and Moore, 1990). Moreover, it is difficult for a pharmaceutical company to 
effectively motivate its biotech counterpart because they differ significantly in terms 
of their knowledge bases, decision-making structures, and reward systems (Powell, et 
al., 1996; Schweizer, 2005). A pharmaceutical company may therefore resist the 
temptation to integrate its biotech partner in order to protect the latter‘s initiatives.  
 
The PRT and the TCE differ in predicting a) the organizational modes of R&D 
projects in the early stages of research exploration; and b) the decision to acquire a 
biotech firm pursuing a number of R&D projects. An R&D project in the early stages 
of research exploration often involves more technical uncertainties and requires more 
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financial support than a project based on mature technologies (Powell, et al., 1996; 
Yeoh and Roth, 1999; Nicholson, et al., 2005). Vertical integration is therefore 
preferred for less mature R&D projects, as suggested by the TCE. However, the 
progress of early-stage explorations depends extensively on the research contributions 
of a biotech firm (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Powell, et al, 1996; Yeoh and Roth, 
1999). Changing the decision-making structures or the compensation packages of a 
biotech partner is particularly costly for a less mature project. The PRT thus predicts 
that it may be preferable to keep a biotech firm as it is in a transaction involves early-
stage R&D activities (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Lerner and Merges, 1998). 
 
Biotech firms frequently pursue various R&D projects simultaneously (Pisano, 1990; 
Lerner and Merges, 1997; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). The incompleteness of 
contracts give a biotech firm the leeway to exploit the resources contributed by a 
pharmaceutical company in those ―extra‖ projects that are not included in a 
partnership (Pisano, 1997; Cardinal, 2001; Lerner, et al., 2003; Nicholson, et al., 
2005). According to the TCE, vertical integration can effectively contain such 
contractual hazards. However, firms pursuing multiple R&D projects may enjoy the 
economy of scope for their research efforts, especially in the biopharmaceutical 
industry. From the PRT perspective, it may be more costly to integrate a biotech firm 
with a number of projects. Hence other contractual arrangements may be preferable.   
 
The results of studying the governance structures of 285 R&D projects show a 
positive relationship between the maturity of an R&D project and the possibility of 
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integration. I also found that the number of projects of a biotech firm is negatively 
correlated to the possibility of integration. Moreover, these two relationships are 
enhanced when a pharmaceutical firm and its biotech counterpart differ significantly 
in terms of their knowledge bases, decision-making structures, and reward systems.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. A brief introduction of the biopharmaceutical 
industry is provided in the next section. In section 3.3, I argue that the PRT fits better 
than the TCE in explaining the governance structures of R&D projects in the 
biopharmaceutical industry. I then proposed 4 hypotheses. The data and methodology 
is specified in section 3.4. Discussion follows.   
 
3.2 Biopharmaceutical Industry 
 
Cohen and Boyer‘s breakthrough finding on recombinant DNA in 1973 laid the 
foundation of the biopharmaceutical industry. Studies in biosciences and 
biotechnologies have been spurred by their extraordinary potential since (Pisano, 
1990; Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Powell, et al., 1996; Nicholson, 2005). The core 
biotechnologies are mostly process innovations that enabled the manipulations of 
microorganisms, such as DNA/protein synthesizing and sequencing, cell fusion 
methodologies for producing hybridomas etc. (Powell, et al., 1996; Schweizer, 2005; 
Nicholson, et al., 2005; Phene, et al., 2006). Health care, agriculture, chemical 
engineering, among many others, benefit much from those innovations.  
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While most of the biotechnologies have their origins in the laboratories of universities 
and research institutes, they are often commercially exploited by small, research-
based companies, the first of which went public in 1980 (Genentech).
3
 Thousands of 
biotech firms have emerged around the globe since (Pisano, 1990; Powell, et al., 1996; 
Nicholson, et al., 2005; Phene, et al., 2006). These entrepreneurial companies 
frequently face stiff obstacles: they are financially constrained while the processes of 
developing new drugs are protracted and expensive (Pisano, 1990; Powell, et al., 
1996; Yeoh and Roth, 1999; Nicholson, et al., 2005). Moreover, moving from basic 
research to product development also requires expertise in conducting clinical trials, 
securing regulatory approvals, scaling up manufacturing, and maintaining distribution 





Young biotech firms may not be well equipped for these tasks, but established 
pharmaceutical companies are. Large pharmaceuticals build up marketing channels 
worldwide over the years and are often flush with cash. But it is often difficult for 
them to create the research environments that foster constant innovations and 
discoveries like biotech firms (Powell, et al., 1996; Javidan, et al., 2004; Schweizer, 
2005). Circumstances of mutual need develop: biotech firms require pharmaceutical 
companies‘ financial support and marketing savvy, while the latter desire the access 
                                                 
3
 Biotechnologies have the potential to transform various fields—pharmaceutical, 
chemical, agriculture, veterinary science, medicine, and waste disposal. I intentionally 
restricted my attention to only those for-profit firms engaged in human therapeutics. 
The human-therapeutics sector is driven by a different research agenda for health care 
and operates within a distinctive regulatory regime (see Powell, et al., 1996 for a 
detailed discussion). 
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to the former‘s research prowess. Various participants in the biopharmaceutical 
industry have turned to mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, research agreements, 
licensing, and other kinds of partnerships to make up for their lack of internal 
capabilities and resources (Pisano, 1990; Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Powell, et al., 
1996; Javidan, et al., 2004; Schweizer, 2005).  
 
3.3 The R&D Boundaries of a Pharmaceutical Company  
 
Confronting broad and rapid technological changes, a pharmaceutical company has to 
decide which new technical capacities to develop internally and which ones to access 
through external collaborative links (Pisano, 1990; Powell, et al., 1996; Zucker, et al., 
2002; Schilling and Steensma, 2002). The TCE predicts a high degree of vertical 
integration in the biopharmaceutical industry since R&D activities for biotech-based 
drugs are subject to high asset specificity and technological uncertainty.  
 
Asset specificity: The outcomes of an R&D project are usually delivered in the form 
of molecules, cells, models, experimental data, and other documentations. However, 
such media cannot capture the tacit dimensions of the relevant technological know-
how. Transferring a project from one R&D partner to another will therefore involve 
substantial losses. A new research partner may have to replicate the original team‘s 
findings before moving forward (Pisano, 1990; Powell, et al., 1996).  
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Uncertainty: Technological uncertainty pervades the processes of discovering, 
formulating, and synthesizing a biotech-based therapeutic compound. At the outset of 
a project, accurate assessments of costs and outcomes are impossible. It is therefore 
futile to attempt to lock-in the terms of trade in an initial contract. Consequently, 
behavioral uncertainty arises because of contract incompleteness and difficulties of 
frequently reviewing the R&D progress (Powell, et al., 1996; Yeoh and Roth, 1999; 
Nicholson, et al., 2005).  
 
Given the high asset-specificity and uncertainty, vertical integration is likely to be the 
desirable governance structure for R&D activities in the biopharmaceutical industry 
according to the TCE. However, scholars often observe extensive procurement 
relationships while only a small fraction of those activities are integrated (Lerner and 
Merges, 1998; Nicholson, et al., 2005; Filson and Morales, 2006). Figure 3.1 shows 
the governance structures of R&D activities in the biopharmaceutical industry from 
1997 to 2004. The numbers of vertical integration have never exceeded a quarter of 







Figure 3.1 Governance Structures of R&D Projects in the 






























The PRT predicts a much less extent of vertical integration than the TCE does. The 
efforts of a biotech firm are critical for the success of an R&D project (Lerner and 
Merges, 1998; Lerner, et al., 2003). Moreover, pharmaceutical companies and biotech 
firms exhibit considerable heterogeneity in terms of their knowledge bases, decision-
making processes, and reward systems (Powell, et al, 1996; Schweizer, 2005). These 
differences may impede a pharmaceutical company from effectively monitoring and 
motivating the newly integrated biotech talents. Integration may result in low 
incentives of the key personnel from a biotech firm: they may shirk and free-ride on 
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their new colleagues from a pharmaceutical company, or leave the newly merged 
organization (Ranft and Lord, 2002; Javidan, et al., 2004; Schweizer, 2005). 
 
Knowledgebase: The scientific breakthroughs of biotechnologies constituted a radical 
change from previously dominant technologies in the pharmaceutical industry, which 
represents ―a dramatic case of a competence-destroying innovation‖ (Powell and 
Brantley, 1992: 368). Biotechnologies are built on immunology and molecular 
biology that are foreign to pharmaceutical companies whose technological tradition is 
built around organic chemistry (Pisano, 1990; Shan, et al., 1994; Powell, et al., 1996; 
Nicholson, et al., 2005). The lack of shared languages, common skills, and similar 
cognitive structures blocks technical communication and learning between partners. 
Integrating knowledge bases is therefore costly and sometimes counterproductive 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Shan, et al., 1994; Nicholson, et al., 2005).    
 
Decision-Making Structure: Biotech firms frequently organize their operations in a 
fashion similar to university laboratories (Powell, et al., 1996). Their decision-making 
structures are highly decentralized, allowing scientists considerable autonomy to 
work on their own projects (Powell, et al., 1996; Javidan, et al., 2004; Schweizer, 
2005). Moreover, employees are encouraged to participate in the scientific 
community, which helps to establish the bona fides with researchers outside. Such a 
dynamic internal environment works particularly well in fostering innovations 
(Powell, et al., 1996; Schweizer, 2005). By contrast, pharmaceutical companies are 
characterized by formal structures, impersonal hierarchy, and long decision-making 
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processes (Javidan, et al., 2004; Schweizer, 2005). Schweizer (2005:1064) quoted a 
manager who is familiar with the merger of Merck and Lexigen as follows:  
 
―Because of the corporate structure and culture within Merck, there is an inability to 
make decisions… Biotech [Lexigen] is not operating by being conservative. Biotech 
operates by taking risks, by being dynamic, by moving very quickly, by trying different 
ideas on a trial base. If it works, you continue. If it doesn‘t work, you try something 
else… All of this has also an entrepreneurial element, which fosters innovation.‖ 
 
The post-acquisition integration of the two different decision-making approaches 
inevitably weakens a biotech firm‘s autonomy. Reduced autonomy in turn curtails 
innovations (Shan, et al., 1994; Powell, et al., 1996; Schweizer, 2005).  
 
Reward System: Employees of a biotech firm understand that there is no job security. 
The limited financial resources do not allow a biotech firm to provide generous salary 
packages or bonus plans. Instead, employees often have significant ownership stakes 
of a biotech firm, so that they are strongly motivated to develop new technologies 
quickly with controlled expenses (Cardinal, 2001; Schweizer, 2005). Formal 
evaluation systems, however, are not a necessity. By contrast, large pharmaceutical 
companies pay their employees handsomely, but the provision of significant stock 
options is rare (Schweizer, 2005). Multidimensional evaluation techniques such as 
subjective assessments and accounting- or market-based performance indices are 
widely adopted (Yeoh and Roth, 1999; Cardinal, 2001; Javidan, et al., 2004; 
Schweizer, 2005). Integration of the incompatible reward systems may lower the 
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incentives of staffs from a biotech firm after acquisition. Schweizer (2005:1064) 
quoted a manager from Bayer as follows:  
 
―I think a major issue is that Bayer does not have stock options, Chiron does. Fortunately 
our packages in terms of salary and bonuses are very good. . . . But it does not make up 
the difference especially in a booming economy like through the 90s.‖ 
 
Because of the differences in the knowledge bases, the decision-making structures, 
and the reward systems, it is costly for a pharmaceutical firm to effectively monitor 
and motivate its biotech counterpart after integration. Acquiring a biotech firm 
inevitably incurs a cost of losing incentives. The PRT suggests that pharmaceutical 
companies may resist their temptation to acquire their biotech partners in order to 




I expect that the TCE and the PRT exhibit considerable heterogeneity in predicting 
the governance structures of R&D projects in the biopharmaceutical industry. This 
heterogeneity is amplified when the contractual relationships involve with A) early-
stage explorations and B) biotech firms with a number of R&D projects.  
 
A) Organizational Modes of Less Mature R&D Projects  
The development of ethical drugs can be decomposed into discrete yet sequential 
stages (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Pisano, 1990; Scherer, 1993; Powell, et al., 
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1996; Cardinal, 2001). Such a process begins with identifying and optimizing the lead 
product candidates such as a molecule that has some desirable therapeutic properties 
(e.g., lowering blood pressure). Promising molecules are then tested on laboratory 
animals to gain a better understanding of their therapeutic effects, side-effects, and 
toxicities. Based on the results of animal tests, decision is made to commence testing 
on human subjects or to terminate the project. If a firm chooses to continue the 
project, it files an Investigational New Drug (IND) application with the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA).
4
 The project has been under the extensive investigations 
and regulations of the FDA since. The safety and efficacy of drug candidates in 
specific dosages and formulations are investigated in three-phase human clinical trials 
if the IND is approved. Phase I trials assess basic safety and are typically conducted 
on a small group of healthy volunteers. Phase II trials assess efficacy and are used to 
determine appropriate doses. In Phase III trials, the performance of a drug candidate 
is compared to placebos and to alternative available therapies by testing on a large 
number of afflicted patients. At the conclusion of Phase III trials, therapeutic 
compounds that are proved to be safe and effective in treating specific diseases are 
ready for market introduction after obtaining regulatory approval from the FDA 
(Scherer, 1993; Azoulay, 2004; Nicholson, et al, 2005).   
 
The pre-clinical phases of drug-development can take several years of laboratory 
research and experimentation. Only a small fraction of molecules make all the way 
                                                 
4
 A similar drug approval process is required in Europe under the administration of 
the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA), the European counterpart of 
the FDA. 
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from research exploration to market introduction (Pisano, 1990; DiMasi, 2000; 
Nicholson, et al, 2005). For an R&D project that covers the early-stage explorations, 
the end-point and the outcomes of the project are highly uncertain and the efforts of 
the biotech firm are hard to specify (Pisano, 1990; Santoro and McGill, 2005; 
Azoulay, 2004). By contrast, uncertainties are significantly reduced when a candidate 
successfully passes pre-clinical tests, since more than 95 percent of all candidates 
have never reached clinical trials (DiMasi, 2000; Giovannetti and Morrison, 2000; 
Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Pharmaceutical companies therefore expect to commit 
more time and financial resources when decide to involve in a less mature R&D 
project. According to the TCE, the earlier a pharmaceutical company involves in an 
R&D project, the higher the possibility that it acquires its R&D partner.  
 
However, the efforts from a biotech firm are significantly more critical in a less 
mature R&D project than in a project that already entered the clinical trials (Lerner 
and Merges, 1998; DiMasi, 2000; Cardinal, 2001). Biotech firms are often 
responsible to provide an assay library through which the lead candidates are 
identified. Their efforts substantially affect the quality of the lead candidates, which 
in turn influence the success rate of clinical trials (Cardinal, 2001; Lerner, et al, 2003). 
According to the PRT, for a less mature R&D project, more property rights should be 
assigned to a biotech partner in order to motivate it to deliver a high quality drug 
candidate. Acquiring a biotech firm is less attractive an option than collaboration 
because subsequent integration inevitably reduces the incentives of the biotech firm 
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(Lerner and Merges, 1998). Therefore, the earlier a pharmaceutical firm involves in 
an R&D project, the less the possibility that it acquires its R&D partner. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The less mature is a R&D project, the less likely a pharmaceutical firm 
acquires its biotech partner. 
 
The cost of integrating an early stage R&D project is particularly high when a 
pharmaceutical firm shares little knowledge base with its biotech partner, or implants 
a decision-making structure that grants little autonomy to researchers, or installs a 
rewards system characterized by low incentive intensity.  
 
It is not enough for a pharmaceutical company to simply ―buy‖ a biotechnology since 
such a technology must be nurtured and integrated to create value (Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Schweizer, 2005). Some commonalities between a pharmaceutical 
company‘s knowledge base and that of its biotech partner can create a bridge of 
familiarity between investors and researchers, which provides a common vocabulary 
that facilitates communications (Shan, et al., 1994; Gittelman and Kogut, 2003). The 
technological frontier of bioscience is advanced with a knowledge base 
fundamentally different from prior know-how (Pisano, 1990; Powell, et al., 1996). 
For a pharmaceutical company who has literally no experience in discovering and 
developing bioscience-based therapeutic compounds, intervene into an early stage 
R&D project can be disastrous. By contrast, a pharmaceutical firm who is familiar 
with biotechnologies may well evaluate and manage the difficulties and risks 
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associated with a less mature project, and the cost of integration may therefore be 
mitigated.  
 
Small biotech firms emphasize on creating an entrepreneurial, innovative and risk-
taking culture. They often organize in a fashion with low levels of hierarchy and open 
communications (Powell, et al, 1996; Schweizer, 2005).  These unique organizational 
characteristics play a key role in discovering and developing novel therapeutic bio-
compounds (Powell, et al. 1996). Such an innovative spirit is simply ill-suited to the 
long and rigid decision-making structure of a pharmaceutical company. Integration is 
therefore costly and counterproductive especially in the early stage of a project: the 
discovery process of drug candidates may be futile or unnecessarily prolonged. 
Innovation, however, plays a less important role in the late-stage of a drug 
development process.  
 
Overall, pharmaceutical companies do not have the same strong (ownership) 
incentives and are more risk-averse than biotech firms (Powell, et al., 1996; 
Schweizer, 2005). However, pharmaceutical companies vary in their willingness to 
adopt stock-based incentive plans. For example, Bristol-Myers Squibb granted its top 
executives significant stock options with (Black-Sholes) value as twice as the sum of 
their annual salary and bonus from 1995 to 1999. Bayer, on the other hand, was 
conservative and did not grant any options to its top executives during the same 
period. A low stock-based incentive plan isolates the researchers‘ incomes from the 
outcomes of a R&D project. Since their efforts critically affect the discovery of drug 
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candidates, lowering the incentive intensity may negatively affect their performance, 
especially in a less immature R&D project. Such a negative effect may be relatively 
insignificant for a mature project. Hence,  
 
Hypothesis 2a: The more similar is the knowledge base of a pharmaceutical firm to that 
of its biotech partner, the smaller the effect of the maturity of a R&D project on the 
likelihood that a pharmaceutical firm acquires its biotech partner.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: The more different is the decision-making structure of a pharmaceutical 
company to that of its biotech partner, the stronger the effect of the maturity of a R&D 
project on the likelihood that a pharmaceutical firm acquires its biotech partner.   
  
Hypothesis 2c: The more different is the reward system of a pharmaceutical company to 
that of its biotech partner, the stronger the effect of the maturity of a R&D project on 
the likelihood that a pharmaceutical firm acquires its biotech partner.   
 
B) Biotech Partners with Multiple R&D Projects  
Biotech firms frequently pursue multiple R&D projects simultaneously (Pisano, 1990, 
1997; Lerner and Merges, 1998). In the biopharmaceutical industry, it is not 
uncommon that discoveries made in one R&D project stimulate the outputs of another. 
For example, several central nervous system therapies were discovered as the by-
products of research for drugs active in the cardiovascular system (Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1996).  
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Consider the case that a biotech firm establishes an advanced laboratory devoted to 
peptide chemistry. The research of a group of peptide chemists is potentially relevant 
to a wide range of applications. The public goods property of knowledge capitals 
allows the biotech firm to transfer those capitals accumulated in one program to other 
related programs at little cost (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Lerner, et al., 2003). 
Such a spillover effect of R&D activities within a firm plays an important role in 
enhancing a firm‘s innovation capabilities.  
 
Henderson and Cockburn (1996) found that firms with a large number of R&D 
programs spend aggressively in R&D activities and are significantly more productive 
than firms with only a few programs in the pharmaceutical industry. Specifically, they 
found that one extra project in an R&D portfolio of a firm brought 1.15 more patents 
to each of the projects within the portfolio. Thus integrating a biotech firm with 
multiple R&D projects incurs higher costs than integrating one with a single project, 
since the economy of scope may be lost along with the biotech firm‘s initiatives. 
According to the PRT, a pharmaceutical firm is less likely to acquire its partner with 
multiple R&D projects than those with a single project since it is more costly for a 
firm with multiple R&D projects to lose its initiative. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The greater the number of R&D projects that a biotech firm pursues, the 
lower the likelihood that it will be acquired by a pharmaceutical firm.  
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It is particularly costly for a pharmaceutical firm to integrate a biotech partner who 
pursues a number of R&D projects when the two parties show great heterogeneity in 
terms of their knowledge bases, decision-making structures, and reward systems.  
 
For a pharmaceutical company, acquiring a capable biotech firm with an unrelated 
knowledge base incurs more costs than acquiring one with a similar knowledge base. 
Kapoor and Lim (2007) found a negative effect of acquisition on the productivity of 
inventors from the acquired firm and such a negative effect is greater when the 
acquirer and the acquiree share little common knowledge. Ahuja and Katila (2001) 
argued that the larger the relative size of the knowledge base to be integrated after 
acquisition, the more negative was the impact of integration on innovation outputs. 
The similarity in knowledge bases, on the other hand, helps a pharmaceutical firm to 
understand and motivate a biotech firm with multiple projects.  
 
Highly compatible decision-making structures between the acquiring and acquired 
firms may facilitate the process of integration (Datta, 1991; Chatterjee, et al., 1993; 
Zollo and Singh, 2004). The economy of scope in the multiple R&D projects within a 
biotech firm may well be preserved after integration if a pharmaceutical firm allows 
loose, informal controls and open channels of communications. This may not be the 
case when the acquirer stresses on operating controls, structured decision-making 
processes, and containing risk-taking behaviors. I therefore expect that the similarity 
in decision-making structures between a pharmaceutical company and its biotech 
partner help the former to smoothly integrate the latter.   
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The reward systems provide incentives for employees within a hierarchy to commit to 
their jobs (Datta, 1991; Datta, et al., 2001). Pharmaceutical companies who do not 
have strong ownership-based incentives may not be able to effectively motivate the 
newly acquired biotech team, compared with those who emphasize on market-based 
compensation plans. Low incentive compensation plan exacerbates the difficulties in 
motivating researchers. This may be positively associated with the losses of a 
multiple-project-biotech partner‘s high productivity. In other words, the differences in 
reward systems between a pharmaceutical company and a biotech firm make the 
integration of a biotech firm with multiple R&D projects more costly. Hence,  
 
Hypothesis 4a: The more similar is the knowledge base of a pharmaceutical firm to that 
of its biotech partner, the smaller the effect of the number of R&D projects that a 
biotech firm pursues on the likelihood that it is acquired by its pharmaceutical partner.  
 
Hypothesis 4b: The more different is the decision-making structure of a pharmaceutical 
company to that of its biotech partner, the greater the effect of the number of R&D 
projects that a biotech firm pursues on the likelihood that it is acquired by its 
pharmaceutical partner.  
 
Hypothesis 4c: The more different is the reward system of a pharmaceutical company to 
that of its biotech partner, the greater the effect of the number of R&D projects that a 




3.5 Sample and Methodology 
 
A) Sample and Data Collection 
I drew a list of R&D projects in the biopharmaceutical industry from Recombinant 
Capital‘s (Recap®) alliance and valuation history database. Recap is a consulting firm 
specializing in the biopharmaceutical industry. It published a list of 706 biotech firms 
in the ―Financial Snapshot‖, a monthly industry report. Recap tracks and analyzes 
information of those firms and maintains one of the most comprehensive and detailed 
biopharmaceutical business intelligence databases. According to Recap, over 40% of 
the agreements are filed as material contracts under the public filing requirements of 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Recap Alliances Database 
currently contains 26,760 high-level summaries of biotech alliances commenced since 
1973, which incorporates ―mergers and acquisitions‖ as one category of alliances.  
 
I focus on R&D projects announced from January 1
st
, 1999 to December 31
st
, 1999. 
Practically, since Recap provides limited number of SEC filings, I collected the 
missing contracts of the deals from EDGAR which is only fully available after 1999. 
There are 1226 deals recorded by Recap in 1999, including 135 announcements of 
mergers and acquisitions, and 1091 announcements of inter-firm collaborations. I 
specified all R&D projects included in each deal, and then excluded projects that 
include nonprofit institutions or universities because those organizations may have 
goals other than profit-maximizing. I also eliminated projects that aim to co-promote, 
co-market, distribute, and manufacture the proposed end-products because the 
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motivations of those deals are different from those of drug discovery (Pisano, 1990; 
Powell, et la., 1996; Nicholson, et al., 2005). I further excluded projects that involved 
with agricultural products, cosmetics, hair growth or nutrition/vitamins, since those 
projects do not need to follow the rigorous regulations of FDA. The final dataset 
include 285 projects including 218 inter-firm collaborations and 67 acquisitions 
among 370 firms. Out of the 370 firms, 157 were classified as pharmaceutical 
companies by Recap, while the rest 213 firms fell into the category of biotech firms. 
 
In the Clinical Trials Progress Database, Recap tracks the progression of 1,924 
clinical trials in which at least one biotech firm has been involved. It also provides 
links to the alliances database if a compound is subject to an active corporate alliance. 
I specified information such as the stage and number of R&D projects in my list. I 
accumulated the firm level information such as total assets, cash reserves, net profits, 
number of employees for all 370 companies from CompuStat. CompuStat also 
contains the executive compensation and firm ownership data. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has ordered that proxy statements contain detailed 
information on the compensation of the five highest paid executives of all publicly 
held corporations since 1992. CompuStat summarizes company Proxy statements and 
contains data such as salary, bonus, and the Black-Scholes value of new stock options 
awarded to top management of a firm.  
 
Finally, I collected the patent data for each firm involved in this research from the 
NUS Patent Database (NPD). NPD summarizes information from three sources, the 
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USPTO Full-Text Retrospective, the Espace European Patents Awarded, and the First 
Page Data Base. NPD specifies the title, assignee names, type, filing date, application 
number, series code, classification information, abstracts, specification, and claims 
for each patent. It also lists the citations of those patents.  
 
Table 3.1 Comparison of Pharmaceutical Companies and Biotech Firms* 
 
   Pharmaceutical Companies   Biotech Firms 
 Max Min Mean       Max Min Mean 
 
Total 




(Mil. USD) (Sanofi) (ISIS 
Pharma) 




Employee  139.02 
 





 (Amgen)   
 
Salary  1640.00 32.35 973.39 1094.91 23.30 229.03 
(1000 USD) (Wyeth) (Bausch 
& Lomb) 
 (Amgen) (Sepractor)  
 
Bonus 4196.33 0.00 364.27 1800.00 0.00 217.48 
(1000 USD) (Lilly)   (Amgen)   
 
Stock 




  (Amgen) (IDEXX)  
 
Patents 1528 2 157.57 197 0 31.37 
 (Bayer) (Schering)  (ALZA)   
 
n 157 213 
* The Mean value for each category is calculated based on the 5-year average from 1995-1999. 
Since the Maximum (Minimum) value for each category varies from year to year, I reported the 




Table 3.1 compares the biotech firms and pharmaceutical companies in terms of their 
size, compensation for top management, and number of patents. Pharmaceutical 
companies are significantly larger than biotech firms, both in terms of total assets and 
number of employees. The salary and bonus for the top management in 
pharmaceutical companies are significantly higher than those for their counterparts in 
biotech firms. However, biotech firms are more aggressive in compensating their 
critical personnel through long-term option plans.   
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 Figure 3.2 reports the breakdown of all projects included in this chapter according to 
their development stages in 1999. The number of inter-firm collaborations steadily 
decreases when R&D projects advance. Most of the acquisitions occurred at the pre-
clinical stage and clinical trial I (21 and 19 cases respectively), while only 9 
acquisitions were conducted when biotechnology projects were at the discovery stage. 
Figure 3.3 reports the breakdown of all projects included in this chapter according to 
the number of R&D projects that a biotech firm was pursuing. Most of the sample 
biotech firms (70.8%) pursued 5 or less on-going R&D projects simultaneously. 
 





Number of R&D projects that biotech firm pursues 
























Dependent Variable  
A pharmaceutical company can get access to biotechnologies either by acquiring 
biotech firms or by forming research alliances with biotech firms. I define the 
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I measure the Maturity of a R&D project by its development stage. Following Lerner 
and Merges (1998), and Lerner, et al, (2003), the process of inventing a new drug is 
classified into 6 stages, including discovery (#1), preclinical test (#2), clinical trial 
phase I (#3), phase II (#4), phase III (#5), and marketing (#6). The six stages are 
coded from 1 to 6 accordingly to reflect the development stage of an R&D project; 
the greater the number, the more mature was an R&D project.  
 
I counted the Number of R&D Projects that a biotech firm were pursuing based on its 
record in ReCap. Biotech firms often discuss the details of their R&D projects in their 
10-K, 10-Q, or S-1 reports. A common practice is to list all drug candidates and group 
them according to their biochemical characteristics. Recap piles up this information 
and traces the progress for each project.  
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I employed a measure introduced by Ahuja and Katila (2001) to calculate the 
Similarity in Knowledge Bases between partners involved in an R&D project.
5
 Ahuja 
and Katila (2001) defined a firm‘s knowledge base as patents obtained by a firm plus 
all backward citations made by those patents in a 5-year period. They then measured 
the relatedness between knowledge bases of two firms as the proportion of one firm‘s 
knowledge base that is the same as the other‘s. Similarly, I defined the Similarity of 
Knowledge Bases as follows: 
Similarity in Knowledge Bases = (the number of patents and citations that are in 
common between a biotech and a pharmaceutical from 1995 to 1999)/ (the 
number of patents and citations of the biotech from 1995 to 1999).  
 
It is clear that the greater the Similarity in Knowledge Bases, the greater the extent 
that a pharmaceutical company and a biotech firm share a common knowledge base.   
  
I employed three measures for the Difference in Decision-Making Structures:  i) 
Ratio of Total Assets between a pharmaceutical company and its biotech counterpart; 
ii) Ratio of Employees between a pharmaceutical company and its biotech counterpart; 
iii) the Nationalities of partners involved in a deal. Previous studies suggested that 
firm size is closely related to the way that a firm arranges its decision-making 
structure. Hannan and Freeman (1984) argued that in large organizations, leaders 
have to delegate authority down long chains of command. As firm size grows, the 
number of levels in authority structures increases and the span of control for an 
                                                 
5
 Similar measures for knowledgebase of a firm were also employed in Silverman 
(1996) and Kapoor and Lim (2007). 
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individual decreases. The decision making processes in large firms often rely on rules 
and regulations, standardized procedures, and other impersonal systems (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984; Wally and Baum, 1994). In small firms, however, decisions are 
developed through discussions and mutual understanding between managers and 
subordinates, based on a system allowing relatively equal distribution of power 
among employees (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Wally and Baum, 1994; Fey and 
Beamish, 2000). As a result, small firms respond to environmental changes faster 
than large firms do (Wally and Baum, 1994; Fey and Beamish, 2000).  
 
The Nationalities of partners are a significant source of heterogeneity in the decision-
making structures (Fors, 1997). Not being familiar, comfortable, or even in agreement 
with the values and operating methods of a foreign partner, executives from a 
pharmaceutical company shy away from the involvement that accompanies 
ownership (Gatingnon and Anderson, 1988). I defined the nationality of a firm as the 
country where its headquarter locates. I coded Nationalities of partners as a one/zero 
dummy variable. Nationalities=1, if partners are from different countries; 
Nationalities = 0, if partners are from the same country.  
 
I adapted a measure that was developed by Datta et al. (2001) to assess the Difference 
in Reward Systems between firms.
 6
 Datta et al. (2001) operationalized the structure of 
a firm‘s compensation contracts as the Black-Scholes value of options granted to the 
top five executives divided by their total compensation. Firms are required to report 
                                                 
6
 Similar operationalization can be found in Ofek and Yermack (2000) and Aggarwal 
and Samwick (1999, 2003). 
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the Black-Sholes value of the options newly granted to their top executives in 10-K 
files. Total compensation is calculated as the sum of salary, bonus, value of restricted 
stock granted, value of new stock options granted, long-term incentive payouts, and 
all other compensation paid to the top five executives. The measure of compensation 
structure captures to what extent the compensation packages of top executives 
correlate with the market-based evaluation of a firm (Ofek and Yermack, 2000; 
Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999, 2003; Datta, et al., 2001). Borrowed the measure of 
compensation structure from Datta et al. (2001), I defined Difference in Reward 
Systems as follows: 
 
Difference in Reward Systems=|(the average compensation structure of a 
pharmaceutical from 1995 to 1999) - (the average compensation structure of a 
biotech from 1995 to 1999)|. 
 
Control Variables 
Prior studies suggest that the financial statues of a biotech firm may affect the 
allocation of property rights (Lerner and Merges, 1998; Lerner, et al, 2003). I 
therefore controlled the Cash Reserve of a biotech firm, measured by the cash plus 
short-term investments at the end of 1998. Oxley (1997) and Gulati and Singh (1998) 
argued that prior interactions between trading partners may reduce the information 
asymmetry between partners, breed mutual trust, and contain opportunistic behaviors. 
Integration may not be necessary as a result. I introduced Prior Interaction, which is 
set to 1 if trading partners have interacted with each other before, 0 otherwise. Table 
3.2 summarizes the variables in this chapter.  
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Table 3.2 Descriptions of Variables 
Variables Description 
Dependent Variable 




 Maturity of project   
 
 
          
 Number of projects  
 
 








o Ratio of Firm Size 
(total assets) 
 














 Prior Interaction 
 
 
Set to 1 if a pharmaceutical company acquires the 
biotech firm; 0, otherwise.   
 
 
1 = discovery stage; 2 = preclinical stage; 3 = clinical 
trial phase I; 4=clinical trial phase II; 5 = clinical trial 
phase III.  
 
Total number of R&D projects that a biotech was 
pursuing. 
 
The number of patents and citations that are in 
common between a biotech and a pharmaceutical  
from 1995 to 1999, divided by the number of patents 





Total assets of a pharmaceutical firm divided by total 
assets of a biotech firm. 
 
The number of employees of a pharmaceutical 
divided by the number of employees of a biotech. 
 
=1 if partners were from different countries; 0 
otherwise. 
 
|(the average compensation structure of a 
pharmaceutical from 1995 to 1999) - (the average 
compensation structure of a biotech from 1995 to 
1999)|. 
 
Cash + short term investment for a biotech firm at the 
end of 1998.  
 
=1 if firms have built alliances before; 0 otherwise 
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C) Data Analysis 
I analyzed the data with logistic regression equations specifying that the logarithmic 
odds of Boundary Choice as a function of the independent variables (McFadden, 
1974; Fienberg, 1980; Seabright, et al., 1992). This model is of the form log[Pi/(l - Pi)] 
= β0+ β1Xi1 + … + βrXir, where Pi is the likelihood of acquisition for the i
th
 
biotechnology project, and Xi1, …, Xir, is a set of predictor variables (Schlesselman, 
1982; Seabright, et al., 1992). The parameters β1, …, βr, represent the effects of the 
independent variables on the natural logarithm of the odds of acquisition.  
 
I assessed the significance of the variables by using the Likelihood Ratio test (LR 
test). The LR test compares the goodness-of-fit of a pair of nested models, with the 
variables of interest being the constraint that distinguishes the models (Bishop, et al., 
1975; Fienberg, 1980; Seabright, et al., 1992). The goodness-of-fit is measured by ―-2 
log-likelihood‖. The LR statistic is calculated by taking the difference between the -2 
log-likelihoods of nested models. Under the null hypothesis, the LR statistic follows a 
chi-square distribution (Bishop et al., 1975; Fienberg, 1980; Seabright, et al., 1992). 
The degrees of freedom for the LR statistic equals to the number of parameters that 
distinguishes the pair of nested models. The LR test is generally more reliable than 
the Wald‘s test in logit analysis. Hauck and Donner (1977) showed that Wald‘s test, 
which is similar to the t-test in OLS, can yield inflated p values. I also reported the 
pseudo R
2
 to indicate the predictive ability of a model.   
 
I conducted regressions in a hierarchical manner. I first developed a model composed 
of the control variables only. The controls-only model served as a basis for examining 
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the effects of Maturity and Number of Projects on Boundary Choice of 
pharmaceutical firms. I tested the effects of these variables by determining if their 
addition improved the fit of the control-only model. Interaction terms were then 
assessed in relation to the model containing all the main effect terms.  
 
3.6 Results  
 
A) Main Effects and Controls  
The breakdown for nationalities of the sample firms is reported in Table 3.3. The 
descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables are reported in Table 3.4. Of all 
the 285 projects in my sample, 88 collaborations were conducted between partners 
who had interacted with each other before, 63 collaborations were formed between 
partners from different countries. A majority (62.4%) of the projects involved early-
stage research programs, while 101 programs were at the stages of clinical trials, and 
7 products were ready to be introduced to the market. Pharmaceutical companies are 
on average 22 times the size of their biotech partners, as measured in total assets. 80 
pharmaceutical companies (which cover 83 projects) adopted significant stock option 
plans for key employees.  
 
The results of estimations are presented in Table 3.5.  I first assessed the effects of the 
control variables (Model 2) in comparison to a model containing only the constant 
term (Model 1). The controls-only model significantly improved the goodness-of-fit 
of the constant term model (χ2 = 20.606, df = 3, p<.001). Additional analyses 
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examined the individual effects of the control variables. The null model in each test 
contains all the control variables except for the variable of interest. The alternative 
model for comparison is the full-control model. Prior Interaction has a significant 
positive impact on the likelihood of integration (χ2 = 15.670, df = 1, p<.001). The 
more cash that a biotech firm possesses, the less the likelihood that it will be acquired 
by its pharmaceutical counterpart (χ2 = 5.602, df =1, p<.05). In general, Model 2 
provides a sound basis for subsequent analyses. I treat this model as a comparison 
standard for examining the effects of Maturity and Number of Projects on the 
likelihood of integration.  
 
Table 3.3 Nationalities of Sample Firms  
Nationality Pharmaceutical Company Biotech Firm 
Brazil  2 0 
Briton 17 8 
China 1 0 
Finland 3 7 
France 25 13 
German 27 32 
India 2 1 
Ireland 3 6 
Japan 11 5 
Spain 8 12 
Sweden 4 17 
Swiss 2 3 
U.S. 52 109 
Total  157 213 
 
 82 
Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations a 
Variables Mean S.D. Max Min 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.Maturity 2.31 1.25 5 1 -         
2. Number of 
Projects 4.69 2.94 16 1 -.016 -        
3. Similarity in 
Knowledge bases .26 .35 1.00 0.00 .214** -.248** -       
4. Ratio of Firm 
Size (total assets) 22.01 29.32 223.12 5.04 -.074 -.043 -.029 -      
5. Ratio of Firm 
Size (employees) 142.74 461.39 5263.0 .13 -.045 -.043 .008 .090 -     
6. Nationalities .22 .41 1 0 -.069 -.033 .077 .013 -.099     
7. Difference in 
Reward System ..93 .75 4.94 .00 -.230** .193** -.273** -.028 -.092 .020 -   
8. Cash 17.93 30.61 363.87 .00 -.004 .076 -.047 .052 .087 -.013 -.053 -  
9. Prior interaction .31 .46 1 0 .178** -.115 .138* -.085 -.138* .067 -.122* .043  
10.Boundary 
Choice .24 .425 1 0 .273** -.285** .466** -.086 -.087 -.012 -.362** -.106 .233** 
a
 N=229 for Difference in Reward System, N=285 for the rest 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
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Table 3.5 Binary Regression Analysis 
a
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant -1.180 (.014) -1.319 (.229) -1.943 (.328) -2.626  (.493) -2.451  (.448) 
Cash   -.018 (.009) -.019 (.012) -.014  (.012) -.013  (.012) 
Prior Interaction   1.166 (.295) .835 (.395) 1.056  (.426) .946  (.418) 
Maturities     .350 (.168) .658  (.219) .650  (.216) 
Number  of Projects     -.226 (.086) -.494  (.167) -.382  (.132) 
Similarity in Knowledge Bases     2.789 (.502) 4.030  (.804) 3.884  (.792) 
Ratio of Firm Size (total assets)     -.008 (.009) -.026  (.020) -.021  (.018) 
Ratio of Firm Size (employee)     -.024 (.020) -.024  (.020) .000  (.000) 
Nationality     -.130 (.483) -.545  (.538) -.275  (.521) 
Difference in Reward System     1.192 (.349) -1.427  (.539) -1.505  (.561) 
Maturity* Similarity in Knowledge Bases       -1.957  (.474)   
Maturity* Ratio of Firm Size (total assets)       .001  (.009)   
Maturity* Ratio of Firm Size (employees)       .008  (.004)   
Maturity* Nationalities       -.335 (.713)   
Maturity* Difference in Reward System       .699  (.356)   
Number  of Projects* Similarity in Knowledge Bases         .519  (.255) 
Number  of Projects* Ratio of Firm Size (total assets)         -.013  (.009) 
Number  of Projects* Ratio of Firm Size (employees)         .000  (.000) 
Number of Projects * Nationalities         -.559 (.646) 
Number  of Projects* Difference in Reward System         -.065  (.172) 
           
-2 Log Likelihood 310.850 290.244 177.219 165.614 162.910 
Change in -2 Log Likelihood  20.606 (p<.001) 113.025 (p<.001) 11.605 (p<.05) 14.309 
b
 (p<.01)   





  0.000 0.048 0.429 0.467 0.476 
N 285 285 229 229 229 
a 
The dependent variable is boundary choice; Statistics in parentheses are standard errors.   
b c 
The Change in -2 Log Likelihood and the difference in df. are between Model 2 and Model 4. 
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Compared with the control-only model (Model 2), Including the main effects (i.e., 
Maturity, Number of Projects, Similarity in Knowledge Bases, Ratio of Firm Size 
(total assets), Ratio of Firm Size (employee), Nationalities and Difference in Reward 
System) in the binary logistic regression (Model 3) greatly improve the model fit (χ2 = 
113.025, df =6, p<.001). I also analyzed those main effects individually by comparing 
a model containing all the controls and the independent variables minus the variable 
of interest. As predicted in Hypothesis 1, I found a significant and positive correlation 
between the Maturity of a R&D project and the likelihood of integration (χ2 = 7.472, 
df =1, p<.01). The Number of Projects that a biotech firm was pursuing has a negative 
impact on the likelihood of integration as predicted in Hypothesis 3, but the 
coefficient is only marginally significant (χ2 = 3.108, df =1, p<.10). The coefficients 
estimated for Similarity in Knowledge bases (χ2 = 1.681, df = 1, p>.10), Ratio of Firm 
Size (total assets) (χ2 = 0.490, df =1, p>.10), Ratio of Firm Size (employee) (χ2 = 
2.160, df=1, p>.10), Nationalities (χ2 = 0.185, df = 1, p>.10), and Difference in 
Reward System (χ2 = 0.257, df =1, p>.10) are in the expected directions but 
insignificant.  
 
B) Interactions  
I first analyzed the interactions between Maturity and the five moderators (Similarity 
in Knowledge bases, Ratio of Firm Size (total assets), Ratio of Firm Size (employee), 
Nationalities and Difference in Reward Systems) in Model 4. I then analyzed the 
interactions between Number of Projects and the five moderators in Model 5.   
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Compared with Model 3, Model 4 significantly improved the goodness-of-fit (χ2 = 
11.605, df = 4, p<0.05). Subsequent analyses tested each of the five interaction terms 
by comparing a model containing all controls, main effects and the interaction terms 
but the interaction term of interest. The results indicate a significant negative 
interaction between Maturity and Similarity in Knowledge Bases (χ2 = 4.670, df = 1, 
p<.05) and a significant positive interaction between Maturity and Difference in 
Reward Systems (χ2 = 6.908, df = 1, p<.01), which are consistent with Hypotheses 2a 
and 2c respectively. Ratio of Firm Size (employee) marginally positively interacts 
with Maturity (χ2 = 2.952, df = 1, p<.10) as predicted in Hypothesis 2b. However, 
interaction between Ratio of Firm Size (total assets) and Maturity is insignificant (χ2 
= 2.952, df = 1, p>.10). So is the interaction between Nationalities and Maturity (χ2 = 
0.223, df = 1, p>.10). As such, I found only limited support for Hypothesis 2b.  
 
In a parallel manner, I examined the interactions between Number of Projects and the 
five moderators, as reported in Model 5. Including the five interaction terms 
significant improves the goodness-of-fit (χ2 = 14.309, df = 4, p<.01). The analyses for 
each interaction terms reveal a significant negative relationship between Number of 
Projects and Similarity in Knowledge Bases (χ2 = 9.881, df =1, p<.01). Number of 
Projects marginally positively interacted with Ratio of Firm Size (total assets) (χ2 = 
2.771, df =1, p<.10) as well as the Ratio of Firm Size (employee) (χ2 = 3.376, df =1, 
p<.10). The interaction between Number of Projects and Nationalities of partner 
firms, however, is insignificant (χ2 = 1.384, df =1, p>.10). Neither is the interaction 
between Number of Projects and Difference in Reward Systems (χ2 = 0.117, df =1, 
 86 
p>.10). These results lend support for Hypotheses 4a and 4b, but fail to support 
Hypothesis 4c.   
 
3.7 Robustness Tests 
 
Out of the 285 R&D projects in my sample, 66 were conducted between the same pair 
of parent firms. That is, a pharmaceutical company sponsored a few R&D projects 
from a single biotech partner, and each of these projects was included in my sample. 
Thus the observations are structured in two levels: Maturity is the level 1 (project 
level) independent variable, which varies across projects; Number of Projects, 
Similarity in Knowledge Bases, Ratio of Firm Size (total assets), Ratio of Firm Size 
(employee), Nationalities, and Difference in Reward System are the level 2 (parent-
firm level) independent variables, which vary across pairs of parent firms. The results 
presented in Section 3.6 may be biased because of such a two-level sample structure 
(Hedeker, et al., 1994).  
 
I estimate several additional models as robustness tests. I replace the project level 
variable (i.e., Maturity) of the repeated observations by a) the average maturity of all 
R&D projects between a pair of parent firms; or b) the development stage of the most 
mature project between a pair of parent firms; or c) the development stage of the least 
mature project between a pair of parent firms. By doing so, my analyses focus on the 
firm level, and the correlations of the error terms across levels are contained. The 
results of the robustness tests are reported in Table 3.6.  
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Table 3.6 Robustness Estimations 
a
 
 a) Replace Maturity by the AVERAGE 
development-stage of all projects 
b) Replace Maturity by the development-
stage of the MOST mature projects 
c) Replace Maturity by the development-
stage of the LEAST mature projects 
 β χ





 (3.328) -.020 (2.287) -.019
†
 (3.033) -.109 (1.959) -.021 (1.974) 
Prior Interaction 1.250** (6.259) 1.231** (6.019) .539
†
 (3.240) .867* (4.000) .772
†
 (2.868) .774 (2.577) 
Maturities .237 (2.228) .470
†
 (2.975) .321* (5.361) .169* (4.235) .146
†
 (3.103) .424* (4.885) 
Number  of Projects -.169
†
 (2.825) -.181 (2.115) -.172* (4.926) -.096 (.312) -.141 (2.282) -.219
†
 (3.030) 
Similarity in Knowledge 
bases 
4.217*** (20.586) 2.904*** (19.576) 6.224*** (15.802) 6.531*** (20.314) 4.355*** (21.792) 2.651*** (28.758) 




-.020 (.718) -.027 (1.841) -.005 (.061) -.027 (2.011) -.011 (.280) -.021 (1.184) 
Nationality -.847 (.217) -.815 (.348) -1.302 (.731) -.302 (.072) -.533 (.125) -.694 (.285) 













Maturity* Similarity in 
Knowledge bases 
-.406 (.367)   -1.249* (5.959)   -.399 (.377)   




.002 (.078)   -.002 (.135)   -.001 (.012)   
Maturity* Nationalities .166 (.078)   .329 (.546)   -.092 (.037)   
Maturity* Difference in 
Reward System 
1.395*** (30.805)   .706*** (23.629)   1.270*** (31.051)   
Number  of Projects* 
Similarity in Knowledge 
bases 
  .061 (.028)   .172 (.478)   .170 (.224) 
Number  of Projects* Ratio 
of Firm Size (total assets)
 b
 
  .002 (.271)   .003 (.557)   .001 (.095) 
Number of Projects * 
Nationalities 
  -.010 (.891)   .047 (.035)   -.399 (1.617) 
Number  of Projects* 
Difference in Reward System 
  -.319 (.002)   -.109* (3.911)   -.094* (4.128) 
a 
Method: Binary Regression Analysis. The dependent variable is boundary choice; Statistics in parentheses are Chi-squre values.  
b 
I have not reported the estimations of Ratio of Firm Size (employees), the results are similar to those of Ratio of Firm Size (total assets).  




The results shown in Table 3.6 are in general consistent with those presented in Table 
3.5. Maturity is positively and significantly correlated with the likelihood of 
integration as predicted in Hypothesis 1, while Number of Projects has a negative 
impact on the likelihood of integration as predicted in Hypothesis 3. The coefficients 
estimated for interactions are largely consistent with what I have reported above. The 
only noticeable difference between Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 is that the interactions 
between differences in decision-making structures (i.e., Ratio of Firm Size (total 
assets), Ratio of Firm Size (employee), and Nationalities) are insignificant.  
 
Another approach to address the multilevel data is to use Hierarchical Linear 
Modeling (HLM) to account for the possible cross-level correlations (Bryk and 
Raudenbush, 1992). HLM provides more precise estimations of the multi-level 
interactions because it takes into account project-level errors and sample size 
differences in estimating parent-firm-level coefficients (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992). 
The results of HLM are rearranged for easy understanding in Table 3.7, which are 
largely consistent with those presented in Table 3.5. The significantly positive 
coefficient of Maturity and the significantly negative coefficient of Number of 
Projects lend support for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3 respectively. Similarity in 
Knowledge Bases and Difference in Reward Systems significantly interacted with 
Maturity, as predicted in Hypotheses 2a and 2c. Similarity in Knowledge Bases and 
Difference in Reward Systems also significantly interacted with Number of Projects, 
as predicted in Hypotheses 4a and 4c. However, I failed to find support for 
Hypotheses 2b and 4b.  
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Table 3.7 Results of HLM Analysis 
a b
 
 Model A Model B 
β SE t β SE t 
Project-Level Predictor       
Maturities .291 .020 14.667*** .426 .030 13.977*** 
Firm-Level Predictors       
Cash  -.001 .001 -1.112 -.000 .001 -.691 
Prior Interaction .105 .046 2.279* .109 .044 2.498* 
Number  of Projects -.017 .023 -.744 -.029 .007 -3.898*** 
Similarity in Knowledge bases .644 .192 3.350*** .473 .061 7.716*** 
Ratio of Firm Size (total assets) -.001 .004 -.174 -.001 .001 -1.099 
Ratio of Firm Size (employee) .000 .000 1.000 -.000 .000 -.390 
Nationality -.066 .050 -1.316 -.033 .048 -.682 
Difference in Reward System -.078 .128 -.611 -.126 .028 -4.466 
Cross-Level Moderators       
Maturity* Similarity in Knowledge bases -.567 .246 -2.305*    
Maturity* Ratio of Firm Size (total assets) .000 .004 .129    
Maturity* Ratio of Firm Size (employees) -.001 .000 -1.725    
Maturity* Nationalities .085 .141 .603    
Maturity* Difference in Reward System .025 .009 27.778***    
Within-Level Moderators       
Number  of Projects* Similarity in Knowledge 
bases 
   .020 .001 28.571*** 
Number  of Projects* Ratio of Firm Size (total 
assets) 
   -.000 .000 -1.322 
Number  of Projects* Ratio of Firm Size 
(employees) 
   .000 .000 1.200 
Number of Projects * Nationalities    .011 .016 .671 
Number  of Projects* Difference in Reward 
System 
   -.025 .008 3.187* 
       
a 
The dependent variable is boundary choice; Statistics in parentheses are standard errors.   
b 
All data were centered (by subtracting the grand mean) prior to HLM.  
 
3.8 Discussion  
  
The results of my study lend some support for the four hypotheses proposed in 
Section 3.4. The analyses provide a finer-grained interpretation of theoretical 
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arguments of the PRT and suggest some interesting and potentially important 
conclusions. 
  
Biotech firms specialize in discovering and developing bioscience-based therapeutic 
compounds. They organize to innovate and their efforts greatly affect the quality of 
drug candidates (Pisano, 1990; Powell, et al, 1996; Nicholson, et al., 2005). 
Pharmaceutical companies know little about the novel technologies but have 
extensive experiences in administrating clinical trials, manufacturing, and marketing. 
As a biotechnology R&D project progresses from the discovery stage to the 
marketing stage, the marginal impact of a biotech firm‘s efforts decreases while that 
of a pharmaceutical company‘s commitments increases. According to the PRT, the 
ownership of a biotechnology R&D project tends to transfer from a biotech firm to its 
pharmaceutical partner as the project matures. Since R&D projects are often the only 
assets that a biotech firm owns, the transfer of the ownership leads to acquisition. 
What I have observed is consistent with the predictions of the PRT, that the 
propensity of integration is significantly positively associated with the maturity of an 
R&D project. 
  
Moreover, as the number of R&D projects that a biotech firm pursues increases, it is 
more likely that the cost associated with integration increases. This is because a 
pharmaceutical company may have to forgo the benefits associated with the spillover 
effects in a multiple-project-biotech‘s research efforts, as integration may readily 
lower its biotech partner‘s incentives. The PRT predicts, as consistent with my 
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findings, that a pharmaceutical firm tends not to integrate a biotech firm with multiple 
R&D projects.  
 
My findings are, in general, inconsistent with the predictions of the TCE. However, a 
simple conclusion that the PRT is superior to the TCE can not be drawn from my 
findings. Rather, these findings merely suggest that the PRT‘s predictions differ in 
important ways from those of the TCE (see also, Holmström and Roberts, 1998; 
Whinston, 2003; Gibbons, 2005). The PRT may better explain certain phenomena 
when the context of transactions fits its line of story-telling. This is the case in the 
biopharmaceutical industry. It is likely that in other cases, the context fits well to the 
TCE. It is therefore worthwhile to exploit what are the components in a context that 
may determine the explanatory power of the TCE and that of the PRT.  
  
I proposed that the differences in the knowledge bases, the decision-making structures, 
and the reward systems between two parties are among the key factors that 
determines the explanatory power of the two theories of the firm. When such 
differences are high, it is difficult for an acquirer to effectively monitor and motivate 
an acquiree. The cost of integration is significant and such a cost increases when the 
marginal returns of an acquiree‘s efforts increases (Grossman and Hart, 1986). The 
descriptions of the PRT fit such a high-difference context, since it suggests that 
investments and trading decisions remain decentralized and hence marginal efficiency 
of an acquire is lost after integration. When partner firms are similar in terms of their 
knowledge bases, decision-making structures, and reward systems, an acquirer may 
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well understand how to monitor and motivate an acquiree. The cost of integration 
may not be significant, and the primary concern of integration is to contain 
opportunism. The low-difference context therefore fit the descriptions of the TCE.   
  
The results of further tests partially support my arguments. The similarity in 
knowledge bases between a pharmaceutical company and it biotech partner 
negatively and significantly moderated the correlation between the maturity of an 
R&D project and the likelihood of integration. In other words, the likelihood of 
integration was less sensitive to the maturity of an R&D project when a 
pharmaceutical company shares a similar knowledge base with its biotech partner. An 
interpretation of this result is that a pharmaceutical company knows well about an 
R&D project and hence can effectively monitor the behaviors of the newly acquired 
biotech team. The cost of integration is therefore significantly reduced. As a result the 
concerns of easing the ex post haggling are relatively more important. A similar 
explanation can also be applied to my findings that the similarity in knowledge bases 
negatively and significantly moderated the correlation between the number of R&D 
projects that a biotech firm was pursuing and the likelihood of integration. 
 
The results partially support my arguments that the differences in decision-making 
structures and the differences in reward systems are significant contextual moderators. 
One possible explanation for the partial consistency would be that pharmaceutical 
companies, well-known for their innovative competence in traditional chemistry, take 
pain to preserve the initiatives and entrepreneurial spirits of their employees despite 
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their large size and diverse culture. Ahuja and Ketila (2001) and Schweizer (2005) 
found that pharmaceutical companies often organize the acquired biotech team as a 
relatively independent division and grant a great deal of autonomy to it. The decision-
making structures and the reward systems therefore may not significantly change 
after integration. 
  
A very large empirical literature lends support to the TCE (Shelanski and Klein, 1995; 
David and Han, 2004; Cater and Hodgeson, 2006). The empirical tests for the PRT 
are rare, despite that the PRT offers a rich set of predictions that worth testing 
(Whinston, 2003, Gibbons, 2005). Whinston argued that it is difficult to conduct a 
structural analysis for the predictions of the PRT, because ―how can we measure 
investments that are assumed to be noncontractible in theory?‖ (2003: 22). Indeed, the 
efforts of a biotech research team are difficult to measure directly. However, the 
predictions of the PRT are about the marginal returns to the noncontractible 
investments rather than the investments itself. I take the maturity and the number of 
projects as proxies to the marginal impact of a biotech firm‘s investments on 
outcomes. This strategy allows me to test the predictions of the PRT in a structured 
manner.    
  
My research carries important implications for managers. My findings highlight the 
importance of taking a broad perspective in evaluating the boundary choices of firms, 
which includes both benefits and costs of vertical integration. Failing to incorporate 
the cost side of integration in an analysis may lead to hierarchical failure. Managers 
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should be well aware of the cost of integration by asking: Is the decision-making 
structure of the target firm compatible to ours? Can we effectively motivate the 
employees of the target firm through our reward system? Are there significant 
synergistic gains by combining the target firm‘s knowledge base with our own?  
 
The real option theory provides an alternative to the PRT in explaining Hypothesis 1. 
A pharmaceutical company may collaborate with a biotech partner to hedge the 
technological uncertainties associated with an R&D project at the early stage of 
research exploration. It then gradually increases its equity stakes in the project as ex 
post technical contingencies reveal over time. The pharmaceutical company finally 
acquires the project when it is fully confident with the future outcomes of the project. 
As such, what we observe is that the more mature an R&D project is, the higher the 
likelihood of integration would be. My findings cannot dismiss such a real-option 
explanation for Hypothesis 1.  
 
I traced the statues for all 216 collaborative R&D projects included in this chapter till 
December 31
st
, 2006 and successfully identified the development stages for 158 
projects when their statues changed. 29 out of the 158 projects were acquired by the 
pharmaceutical sponsors by the end of 2006, with an average Maturity of 2.833 
(s.d.=1.407), significantly higher than the average Maturity (1.918, s.d.=1.071) for the 
rest 129 projects that were not acquired. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 1, 
but still fails to differentiate the predictions of the PRT and those of the Real-Option 
Theory. I therefore admit this limitation and submit it for the future research.  
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This chapter has other limitations. The relative size and the nationalities of partners 
may not capture certain features of decision-making structures well. A comprehensive 
index includes the speed, scope, and risk-attitude of managers may better reflect the 
decision-making structure of a firm. I retain the scope of my study in the 
biopharmaceutical industry. Future research may incorporate multiple industries 
which can provide some variance in the context variables. A comprehensive 
comparison between the explanatory power of the TCE and PRT is therefore possible. 
I focus on the projects announced in 1999 for the sake of data availability. On the one 
hand, this strategy reduces the effects of many macro economic factors such as the 
GDP growth, the fluctuation of stock market, and the implementation of new 
regulations. On the other hand, it limits the possibility of exploring the interactions 
between those macro economic factors and the firm- or relation-level factors. More 
insights could be gained if a multiple-year frame is incorporated. Nonetheless, this 
chapter reported herein uniquely contributions to our knowledge of the theories of the 
firm and suggested that it would be fruitful to put the predictions of the PRT and 









Inter-firm alliances that build on self-governing and weak property rights have 
become one of the most important organizational modes during the last three decades 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998; Kale, et al., 2002; Singh and Mitchell, 2005). This hybrid 
organizational form of market and hierarchy plays an important role in today‘s 
knowledge-intensive economy, in which the protection of intellectual properties and 
the exchange of ideas are both critical for a firm‘s success (Oxley, 1997; Dyer and 
Singh, 1998; Kale, et al., 2002).  
 
Firms form alliances when other firms have comparative advantages in certain 
functions (Kogut, 1988; Ahuja, 2000; Sobrero and Roberts, 2001). In the case of the 
biotech-pharmaceutical alliances, biotech firms possess novel drug discovery 
technologies, whereas pharmaceutical companies have extensive experience of 
managing clinical trials, scaling up manufacturing, and marketing end-products 
(Pisano, 1990; Powell, et al., 1996; Lerner and Merges, 1998; Nicholsen, et al., 2005). 
Due to the complementarity between their capabilities, collaborations between 
biotech firms and pharmaceutical companies proliferated in the past two decades, 
with many R&D projects for new drugs carrying out by those alliances (Pisano, 1990; 
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Powell, et al., 1996; Lerner, et al., 2003; Nicholsen, et al, 2005). However, the 
outcomes of an alliance and the efforts that a biotech firm devotes to the project are 
often difficult to specify in an enforceable contract (Pisano, 1990; Powell, et al, 1996; 
Lerner and Merges, 1998). Ensuring that the property rights (i.e., the residual control 
that is not specified in a contract) are allocated properly is therefore essential to the 
performance of an alliance (Lerner, et al., 2003).  
 
Aghion and Tirole (1994) suggested that the allocation of property rights between 
partners is determined by two factors. First, property rights should be assigned to a 
party if the marginal efficiency of its investments is greater than that of its partner. 
Grossman and Hart (1986) have shown that this is the socially optimal way of 
allocating property rights. Second, the ex ante bargaining power of collaborating 
parties may affect the actual allocation of property rights. In the case of biotech-
pharmaceutical alliances, financial constraints of a biotech firm weaken its bargaining 
position and induce its pharmaceutical partner to inefficiently retain some property 
rights. Thus, the asymmetric bargaining power of alliance partners causes the actual 
allocation of property rights to deviate from the socially optimal way. According to 
the PRT, losing property rights reduces the incentive of a biotech firm in committing 
to an alliance, which results in a suboptimal level of alliance performance.  
 
Nonetheless, alliances do not exist in a vacuum but partners must interact with each 
other under certain social contexts (Kogut, et al., 1992; Gulati 1995, 1999; Sobrero 
and Roberts, 2001). Partners may engage in a repeated relationship. Prior direct 
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interactions provide first-hand information on the reliability and trustworthiness of a 
specific partner. Gulati (1995) and Dyer (1996) argued that firms with prior 
relationships know each other better and they are familiar with each other‘s ways of 
doing thing, therefore they tend to trust each other. Moreover, referential information 
is available through comments from a third party. The socially undesirable behaviors 
are discouraged since those behaviors are likely to be reported to other firms through 
referential channels by a victim (Kreps, 1990; Raub and Weesie, 1990). When such a 
reputation effect is important, partners would concern more about the future 
interactions with other firms within the network. Trust and reputation effect may give 
rise to certain informal agreements between partners which can not be enforced by a 
third party (Raub and Weesie, 1990; Kandori, 1992; Baker, et al., 2002). Such 
agreements may substitute formal structures to provide incentives for a biotech firm 
to commit in a relationship (Grannovettor, 1985; Gulati, 1995, 1999; Kale, et al., 
2000; Baker, et al., 2002). The negative effects of the distortion in formal structures 
on performance may therefore be mitigated.   
 
This chapter attempts to empirically study to what extent the trust and reputation 
effect can mitigate the negative impact of improper allocation of property rights on 
alliance performance in the biopharmaceutical industry. I predict that a weak 
bargaining position of a biotech firm will lead to a sub-optimal level of alliance 
performance (see also Aghion and Tirole, 1994; Lerner and Merges, 1998). However, 
this negative impact will be reduced when partners interact under a circumstance 
characterized by high trust and strong reputation effect. I constructed an index of 
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property rights misallocation and found a significant negative relationship between 
the ex ante bargaining power and the degree of property rights misallocation by a 
sample of 222 biotech-pharmaceutical alliances. I also found that such a misallocation 
significantly related to the early dissolution of an alliance and the dissatisfactory 
progress of an R&D project. However, this relationship was weakened when partners 
shared a history of prior interactions or the alliance was embedded in an extensive 
network where reputation effect was strong.   
 
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I review the literature and 
propose four hypotheses. Section 4.3 specifies the sample and methodology. The 
results of analysis are presented in section 4.4. I discuss my findings in section 4.5.   
 
4.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
 
A.  Marginal Efficiency, Bargaining Power, and Allocation of Property Rights 
A key insight of the property right theory (PRT) is that property rights should be 
purchased by an agent who could use it most productively (Grossman and Hart, 1986; 
Hart and Moore, 1990; Holmström and Roberts, 1998; Gibbons, 2005). This is 
because the owner of an asset is entitled with all residual controls associated with the 
asset and she can claim all income flows accrued to the asset. Therefore she is willing 
to make the optimal investment decisions and to use the asset most efficiently. 
However, in the context of inter-firm relationships, giving power to an agent means 
taking power away from someone else and that someone else has lower incentives as 
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a result (Grossman and Hart, 1986: Hart and Moore, 1990; Halonen, 2002; Gibbons, 
2005). The PRT argues that property rights should belong to an agent whose 
investments are critical for the creation of economic surplus. Such an agent is 
therefore motivated to mount her investments, and hence the outcomes of an alliance 
are maximized (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990).  
 
However, Aghion and Tirole (1994) argued that the asymmetry of the ex ante 
bargaining power between partners may count for a distortion of the actual property 
rights allocation. Young firms with novel technologies frequently lack the financial 
resources and the marketing expertise that are required to effectively introduce a new 
product. Those firms often rely on alliances with established corporations to finance 
their R&D projects. Aghion and Tirole (1994) argued that when an R&D firm has a 
strong ex ante bargaining position, the property rights associated with an R&D 
project will be efficiently allocated as depicted in the PRT: if the marginal efficiency 
of the young firm‘s efforts on the outputs are greater than those of the sponsor‘s 
investments, the young firm will retain the property rights; otherwise, the young firm 
will assign the ownership to the established firm in exchange for a cash payment. 
However, when the established company has greater bargaining power ex ante, it will 
always retain the control rights since the cash-constrained young firm cannot afford to 
compensate the established company for transferring the ownership, regardless of the 
marginal efficiency of their efforts/investments. Under such a circumstance, the 
allocation of property rights deviates from the optimal way specified by the PRT.  
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In the biopharmaceutical industry, biotech innovations are foreign to pharmaceutical 
companies whose technological tradition is built around organic chemistry (Pisano, 
1990; Shan, et al., 1994; Powell, et al., 1996). Therefore, the success of delivering a 
lead candidate and the subsequent adjustments of the candidate depend heavily on the 
research efforts of a biotech firm (Shan, et al., 1994; Powell, et al., 1996; Lerner and 
Merges, 1998; Lerner, et al., 2003). According to the PRT, a large share of property 
rights should be allocated to a biotech partner to ensure that it will fully command its 
research excellence to deliver high quality therapeutic compounds (Lerner and 
Merges, 1998; Lerner, et al., 2003). Pisano and Mang (1993) examined the allocation 
of an exclusive commercializing right in a set of 70 biotechnology alliances, and 
found a positive relationship between the capabilities of a biotech partner and the 
share of property rights allocated to it. 
 
However, biotech firms are often constrained financially. They often rely on the 
support from pharmaceutical sponsors to advance their R&D programs. According to 
Aghion and Tirole (1994), the financial constraints weaken the ex ante bargaining 
power of biotech firms, and give pharmaceutical sponsors some leeway to 
inefficiently retain property rights (Lerner and Merges, 1998; Lerner, et al., 2003). 
Take the alliance between ALZA, a biotech firm specialized in drug-delivery 
technologies, and Ciba-Geigy as an example. At the time of alliance formation, 
ALZA faced a major financial crisis. During the negotiation, ALZA soon found out 
that it has no position to bargain with Ciba-Geigy. The contract assured almost total 
control of the alliance to Ciba-Geigy: The Swiss pharmaceutical giant was given a 
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super-majority on the joint management board, the right to license and manufacture 
any of ALZA‘s current and future products. Lerner and Merges (1998) investigated 
the allocation of the control rights in 200 randomly selected biotechnology alliances. 
They found that biotech firms gain more control rights when they have strong 
financial status. 
 
Property rights or residual controls are bargaining levers that influence the division of 
benefits generated by an R&D project (Grossman and Hart, 1996; Aghion and Tirole, 
1994). Losing property rights to a pharmaceutical sponsor therefore inevitably lower 
a biotech firm‘s incentive to commit in an R&D project, which may in turn result in 
suboptimal alliance performance (Lerner, et al., 2003). By checking biotech-
pharmaceutical alliances formed during 1980–1995, Lerner, Shane, and Tsai (2003) 
found that, when it is easier for biotech firms to finance their R&D projects internally, 
they are more independent and have more bargaining chips ex ante. As a result, they 
manage to keep more control rights when collaborating with pharmaceutical 
companies. Those alliances perform significantly better than alliances in which 
biotech firms are in weak bargaining position.    
 
Hypothesis 1: The weaker the ex ante bargaining power of a biotech firm, the higher the 
degree that the property rights will be misallocated.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the degree that the property rights are misallocated, the worse 
the performance of a biotech-pharmaceutical alliance.  
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B. Trust, Reputation effect and Performance of an Alliance 
Firms seldom interact with each other blindly; rather, referential information could be 
drawn from a variety of channels such as a history of direct interaction or a 
recommendation from a relevant third party (Grannovatter, 1985; Gulati, 1995, 1999). 
Information asymmetry is reduced while mutual trust and concerns over reputation 
emerge. Socially undesirable behaviors are therefore greatly discouraged (Gulati, 
1995; 1999; Das and Teng, 1998; Kale, et al., 2000). 
 
Actual transactions reveal more complex contracting patterns than the ‗one-shot‘ 
contracts depicted in the typical incomplete contract models such as Grossman and 
Hart (1986) and Aghion and Tirole (1994). Pairs of firms undertake repeated sets of 
alliances on different topics. Such alliances involve intensive communications and 
interactions both at firm and personal levels (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Gulati, 1995; 
Oxley, 1997; Gulati and Sigh, 1998). The first-hand information reveals the reliability 
and trustworthiness of specific partners. As a result, firms that have worked together 
know each other better. They are familiar with each other‘s ways of doing thing. 
Previous cooperative interactions between alliance partners therefore generate an 
initial base for inter-organization trust (Granovetter, 1985; Podolny, 1994; Gulati, 
1995; Dyer, 1996; Kale, et al, 2000). 
 
A firm‘s cooperative history gives its partner an opportunity to assess its ability and 
willingness to follow through on its promises, therefore assures the predictability of 
its behavior (Parkhe, 1993; Gulati, 1995; Dyer, 1996; Oxley, 1997). Perhaps the 
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biggest concern of firms entering alliances is the predictability of their partner‘s 
behaviors. Purchasing residual control rights is one way for making behaviors 
predictable, and another is forging trust (Gulati, 1995). Where there is high level of 
mutual trust, partners consider that it may be unnecessary to rely on ownership to 
ensure the power of correcting opportunisms (Parkhe, 1993; Gulati, 1995; Oxley, 
1997; Zaheer, et al., 1998).  
 
Moreover, mutual trust may give rise to informal agreements that substitute property 
rights to provide incentives for a biotech firm to commit in an R&D project. Inter-
firm collaborations often involve hand-in-glove agreements through which parties 
reach accommodations when unforeseen events occur (Kogut, et al, 1992; Oxley, 
1997; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Zaheer, et al., 1998). For example, a pharmaceutical 
company may promise its biotech partner a bonus if the proposed drug is successfully 
delivered. Those informal agreements cannot be verified and enforced by a third party 
(e.g., a court), and therefore are not credible in a ‗one-shot‘ contractual setting. 
However, trust eases a firm‘s concerns of being the victims of defection because the 
norm of loyalty and the equity that developed during prior interactions reduce the 
behavioral uncertainty. An informal agreement therefore stands a chance to be 
credible and sustainable. Such an agreement provides additional benefits to a biotech 
firm, contingent upon the success of an R&D project. Therefore, a biotech firm may 
not lose its initiative even when most property rights are assigned to its 
pharmaceutical partner. As a result, although the property rights are inefficiently 
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allocated, the alliance still stands a chance to be successful (Bull, 1987; Cusumano 
and Takeishi, 1991; Baker, et al., 2002). 
 
There is an emerging consensus among scholars that mutual trust creates the basis for 
an enduring and effective relationship between the contracting firms (Ring and Van 
de Van, 1992; Parkhe, 1993; Gulati, 1995, 1999; Zaheer, et al., 1998; Kale, et al, 
2000). Parkhe (1993) found that the presence of a prior history of cooperation 
between alliance partners limited their perception of opportunisms in new alliances 
and, as a result, reduced the necessity for adopting contractual safeguards. Gulati 
(1995) showed how trust enabled firms to reduce dependence on equity structures to 
govern their relationships. Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone (1998) demonstrated how 
trust reduced negotiating costs in alliances and enhanced alliance performance. As 
such, the mutual trusts between partners reduce each other‘s fear of being victims of 
opportunisms and therefore partners are more willing to cooperate (Bradach and 
Eccles, 1989; Ring and Van de Van, 1992; Kale, et al, 2000) 
 
Hypothesis 3: Mutual trust negatively moderates the relationship between misallocation 
of property rights and the performance of an alliance.  
 
Referential information such as a recommendation from a relevant third party creates 
reputation effect that also promotes cooperation between partners (Grannovatter, 
1985; Gulati, 1995, 1999). Information exchanges between participants of an alliance 
are not limited to their immediate network ties but also indirect referrals (Galati, 1995, 
1999). Hearing from one‘s bankers or suppliers that an intended partner is reliable 
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and competent increases the willingness of a firm to cooperate with the partner. 
Meanwhile, victims of defections are likely to bad-mouth defectors through those 
indirect channels. Gulati (1999) stated that ―two firms may learn about each other by 
virtue of sharing one or more alliance partners in common, who may have introduced 
them and perhaps vouched for their reliability‖ (p. 403).  
 
The threats of bad-mouthing count on a firm‘s interests in keeping a spotless 
reputation as a trustworthy and reliable business partner. The reputation effect is 
amplified when extensive indirect referral channels exist between partners. Under 
such circumstances, the reputation effect may deter a party‘s temptation of taking 
opportunistic behaviors, since the victim is able to inform many other parties, and 
these parties may somehow verify the accusations (Kreps, 1990; Raub and Weesie, 
1990; Gulati, 1995). A reputation of cheater will be spread out and the defector‘s 
prospect of future interactions with other firms will be in jeopardy (Portes and 
Sensenbrenner, 1993; Burt and Knez, 1995; Gulati, 1995).  
 
In a social context characterized by multiple indirect referral channels, partners may 
be forced to resist the temptation of shirking, exploiting jointly owned assets, or 
defecting from an informal agreement (Burt and Knez, 1995; Gulati, 1995). Kandori 
(1992) proved that under the public observability assumption (i.e., each agent‘s past 
actions are observable to all others), an equilibrium in two-player repeated game is 
also an equilibrium in a multiple-player repeated game with arbitrary population size 
and matching rule. Gulati (1995) argued that indirect referral channels help to contain 
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opportunistic behaviors. He found that the number of common-third-party between 
partners is negatively related to the application of safeguards in alliance contract.   
 
The possibility of disciplining the partner through bad-mouthing can serve as a 
substitute for contractual commitments (Raub and Weesie, 1990; Burt and Knez, 
1995; Gulati, 1995). Similar to trust, the reputation effect helps to establish the 
credibility of informal agreements. Such agreements make the formal contractual 
enforcements more or less redundant. In a social context characterized by strong 
reputation effect, although property rights are inefficiently allocated in a contract, 
partners may voluntarily behave positively and therefore enhances an alliance‘s 
chance to be successful.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Reputation effect negatively moderates the relationship between 
misallocation of property rights and the performance of an alliance.  
 
4.3 Sample and Methodology 
 
Sample 
A list of biotech-pharmaceutical alliances was drawn from Recombinant Capital‘s 
alliance and valuation history databases. Financial information of participants was 
collected from Compustat. Contracts for each alliance were gathered from SEC 
filings of alliance participants through on-line SEC filing search (EDGAR).  
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I focus on alliances built in 1999. Developing a new drug is time consuming. It often 
takes seven or more years to finish the whole process from identifying a target to 
gaining a regulatory approval for a new ethical drug (Grossman, 2003). Including 
alliances formed in 1999 gives a necessary time lag for those alliances to reveal their 
progresses and achievements. Following a similar sample-selection process described 
in Chapter 3, I exclude alliances that included nonprofit institutions or universities, 
alliances that aimed to co-promote, co-market, distribute, and manufacture the 
proposed end-products, and alliances that focused on issues such as agriculture, 
cosmetics, hair growth or nutrition/vitamins. A 222-alliance (built among 338 firms) 
sample was used in this chapter.  
 
Dependent Variable  
I measure the performance of an alliance by its duration and progress. Duration is 
calculated by the number of months from the start of an alliance till the termination of 
it. Figure 4.1 reports the breakdown of my sample alliances according to their 
Duration. 
 
Measuring performance by only looking at the dissolution of an alliance fails to 
distinguish between a natural death and a premature termination as many alliances 
ended when their objectives were met successfully (Kogut, 1991). In addition, an 
extension of alliance is not necessarily indicating a success, since an extension may 
be more out of inertia or the high exit barriers than the willingness to extend a 
partnership (Gulati, 1998). 
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Therefore, Progress is introduced as an alternative measure of the performance of an 
alliance. Following Lerner and Merges (1998), and Lerner, Shane and Tsai (2003), 
the process of inventing a new drug are classified into 6 stages, including discovery, 
preclinical test, the clinical trial phase I, phase II, phase III, and marketing. The six 
stages are coded from 1 to 6 accordingly to reflect the progress of a biotechnology 
alliance. Progress is measured by the difference between the stage when an alliance 
was terminated and the stage when an alliance was formed. Figure 4.2 shows the 
breakdown according to alliance Progress.    
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Figure 4.2 Sample Breakdown According to Alliance Progress 
 
1: Projects proceeded from discovery stage to preclinical stage 
2: Projects proceeded from preclinical stage to clinical trial I 
3: Projects proceeded from clinical trial I to clinical trial II 
4: Projects proceeded from clinical trial II to clinical trial III 
5: Projects proceeded from clinical trial III to marketing. 
 
Independent Variables  
Misallocation of Property Rights. The Misallocation of property rights is measured 
by the difference between the normative and the positive allocation of marketing 
rights. Lerner and Merges (1998) and Lerner, et al. (2003) classified a broad range of 
control rights over an R&D project from the right to terminate a project to the right to 
market the final product universally. Here I only focus on the marketing right since 
the very essence of intellectual property rights is the ability to exclude others from 
using it, and the inability to do so will destroy incentives to invest in the creation of 












1 2 3 4 5 
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delegations of public power, and bargaining power is nothing more than what the law 
says it will and will not protect (Sunder, 1996; Aoki, 1996). Therefore marketing 
right embodies the legal rules defining intellectual property rights, which promises 
innovators an exclusive right to exploit her invention (O‘rourke, 2000).  
 
The socially optimal way of allocating marketing rights (MRnormative) is to allocate an 
exclusive marketing right to the party who are solely responsible for the R&D project 
(Aghion and Tiorle, 1994; Lerner and Merges, 1998). MRnormative = 1 if the biotech 
firm is responsible for R&D; 0.5 if both the biotech firm and the pharmaceutical 
company are responsible; 0 if the pharmaceutical company is responsible for the 
research. The positive allocation of marketing rights (MRpositive) is measured by 
whether an exclusive marketing right was assigned to the biotech firm. MRpositive = 1 if 
an exclusive marketing right was assigned to it; 0.5 if a nonexclusive marketing right 
was assigned to it; 0 if no right was assigned to it. 
positivenormative MRMRionMisallocat  . It is clear that the higher the value of 
Misallocation, the higher the degree of misallocating property rights in an alliance.   
 
Ex ante Bargaining Power. I measure the ex ante bargaining power of a biotech firm 
by its financial strength. The financial strength is indicated by a biotech firm‘s returns 
to equity (ROE) and the Inverse of Survival Time (see also Lerner, et al 2003). Firms 
that with positive returns to equity are easier to subsequently issue equity compare to 
those with negative ROE (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Masulis and Korwar, 1986; 
Mikkelson and Partch, 1986). Thus the ex ante bargaining power of a biotech firm is 
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strong when its ROE is high. I computed ―survival time‖ by the ratio of a firm‘s cash 
reserves to the absolute value of its net income at the end of 1998 for those with 
negative net-income. The Inverse of Survival Time is 0 for firms with positive net 
income, since their survival time is supposedly infinite (Lerner, et al 2003).  
 
Trust. Trust between alliance partners is measured by prior interactions between 
them (Gulati, 1995, 1999; Oxley, 1997). Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter stated, ―…as 
firms work with each other, trust is built among individual members of the 
contracting firms because of the close personal ties that develop between them.‖ 
(2000:220). The Recap provides a history of all the alliances in which a firm 
participated from 1988 till now. Trust is coded as 1 when a pair of firms interacted 
with each other before and zero otherwise. 
 
Reputation.  Reputation effect is measured by the Number of Common Third Parties 
between partners (Gulati, 1995, 1999). The common third partners include all firms 
that directly interacted with both the biotech firm and the pharmaceutical company of 
an alliance in the history.   
 
Control Variables 
International. Compared with a domestic alliance, a multinational alliance is more 
complex to manage (Oxley, 1997, 1999; Gulati and Singh, 1998). I introduce 
International as a control variable, coded as 1 if partners were from different nations, 
0 otherwise.  
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Ratio of firm size. Prior studies found that size asymmetries between partners 
destabilize their partnerships (Harrigan, 1988; Pharke, 1993). I introduce Ratio of Size 
as a control variable, measured by the ratio of a pharmaceutical company‘s total 
assets to that of a biotech firm. Table 4.1 summarizes the variables in this chapter.  
 
























Ratio of Firm Size 
 
The extent that property rights are not assigning to the party 
performing the R&D activities.   
 
The number of stages had an R&D project proceeded during 
collaboration. 
 
Number of months that an alliance was in operation.   
 
Ratio of net-income to the booked equity.   
 
=0 if a biotech firm‘s net-income is positive. Otherwise is 
calculated by the inverse of the times that its current cash 
divided by its losses of last year.  
 
=1 if partners interacted before; 0 otherwise 
 




=1 for international alliances, =0 for domestic alliances 
 
(Total assets of a pharmaceutical)/(total assets of a biotech) 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variables Mean S.D. Max  Min  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
 a
 
1.ROE .012 .101 .728 -.736 -        
2. 1/survive time .323 1.041 10 .000 -.58** -       
3. Prior interaction .26 .448 2 0 .046 -.082 -      
4. Number of common 
third party 
2.47 1.687 5 .00 .076 -.026 -.022 -     
5 International .22 .416 1 0 .004 .080 .132 .078 -    
6. Ratio of firm size 23.05 31.64 5.04 223.1 .052 .057 -.081 -.108 .052 -   
7. Misallocation .55 .468 1 .00 -.37** .20** .09 .087 -.056 -.026 -  
8. Progress 
a
 1.79 1.205 5 0 .171* -.176* .42** .21** .105 -.14 -.28** - 
9. Duration 54.80 26.13 96 6 .18** -.144* .109 .20** .018 -.063 -.37** .25** 
†   
n = 222 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
a










The descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables are reported in Table 4.2. 
For the 222 alliances in my sample, 56 alliances are formed between partners who 
have interacted with each other before, 49 alliances are formed between partners from 
different countries. Pharmaceutical companies were 23.05 times the size of their 
biotech counterparts on average, as measured in total assets. Almost half of the 
alliances (109) are under severe misallocation of the marketing rights (Misallocation 
= 1), 26 of them show certain extent of misallocation (Misallocation = .5), while in 
the rest 87 alliances the marketing rights are optimally allocated (Misallocation = 0).  
 
Table 4.3 reports the results of the ordered logistic regressions that test H1. 
Regression i includes only independent variables, while regression ii adds in the 
control variables. ROE is significantly and negatively correlated with Misallocation 
(p <.001), as predicted by H1. The positive and marginally significant coefficient of 
Inverse of Survival Time is also consistent with H1. These results shows that the 
greater the financial strength of a biotech firm, the less the degree of misallocation. 
That is, pharmaceutical companies tended to retain more property rights when biotech 
firms were financially constrained. The Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square tests show that 
in both regressions i and ii, the fitted models significantly fit better than the intercept-
only models (p<.001). The insignificant Chi-Square statistics of Parallel Lines Tests 
(5.439 for regression i and 6.307 for regression ii) indicate that lines of the same 




Table 4.3 Bargaining Power and the Allocation of Marketing Rights† 


















Ratio of firm size 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square 















































Link function: Logit  
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05  
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
 
Table 4.4 shows the results of Cox Proportional Hazards Model (column A) and OLS 
regression (column B) that aim to examine the impact of Misallocation on Duration 
and Progress.
7
 Cox Model was conducted since Duration is right-censored as 34 
biotech alliances are still in operation till the end of 2006. Model 1 includes control 
variables, Misallocation, Prior Interaction, and Number of Common Third Parties; 
model 2 includes two more interactions between Misallocation and the social context 
                                                 
7
 I also regress Progress on independent variables using Ordered Logistic Model. The 
results are largely consistent with those of OLS regression (See Appendix).  
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variables. The positive and significant coefficients of Misallocation in model 1A and 
2A suggest that the misallocation of marketing rights accelerated the dissolution of an 
alliance. In model 1B and 2B, the negative and significant coefficients of 
Misallocation indicate that the degree of misallocating marketing rights was related to 
the slow progress of an R&D project. These findings lend support to H2. The 
interaction between Misallocation and Number of Common Third Party in model 2A 
is negative and marginally significant, which supports H4. That is, when partners 
shared a large number of common third parties, the accelerating effect of 
Misallocation on alliance dissolution was significantly mitigated. However, the 
moderating effect of Prior Interaction on alliance dissolution is insignificant. 
Similarly, the interaction term between Misallocation and Prior Interaction in model 
2B has a significant and negative coefficient, which is consistent with H3. That is, 
when partners shared a history of interactions, the negative effect of misallocating 
marketing right on the progress of an R&D project was mitigated. The moderating 
effect of Number of Common Third parties on project progress is insignificant. 
 
Although the construct of Misallocation is of theoretical importance and shows some 
explanatory power in interpreting the performance differences of alliances, is it 
empirically necessary to introduce this construct at all? Model 3 and Model 4 in Table 
4.4 include the ROE and Inverse of Survive Time in regressions and show that 
Misallocation still plays a significant role in predicting the performance level of an 
alliance. Therefore, the construct of Misallocation is with significant empirical 
importance, as well as theoretical importance. 
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Table 4.4 Analysis for Alliance Performance  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 














Prior interaction  
 
 
Number of common 
third parties 
 
Misallocation × Prior 
interaction  
 
Misallocation × # of 










































































































































































































































































































































***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, 
†
p<.1 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
A: Dependent variable is Duration of Alliance (CPHM). 
B: Dependent variable is Progress of Alliance (OLS).  





4.5 Robustness Tests 
 
The often applied measures for alliance performance, such as duration and survival, 
have long been criticized as problematic in the strategy literature (Kogut, 1991; 
Gulati, 1998).  Coding the dissolution/continuity of an alliance as a dummy neglects 
the different reasons behind the alliance termination (Kogut, 1991; Gulati, 1998). It is 
therefore meaningful to further explore why an alliance dissolves besides when it 
dissolves.  
 
I examined the reasons behind the dissolution and found that the status of alliances 
can be classified into the following 4 categories at the point of dissolution: a) 
terminated because of technical difficulties such as failed to pass a clinical trial 
(Termination); b) terminated because of severe legal disputes (Litigation); c) 
permanently suspended for unspecified reasons (Suspending); and d) ending a 
contract by one party acquiring its partner (Acquisition). Table 4.5 reports the 
distribution of dissolution reasons in my sample. 
  
Table 4.5 Outcomes of Alliances  
 Continuing Dissolved 


































I then explored the effect of misallocating property rights by running multinomial 
regressions. The dependent variable was a typology of alliance statues at the point of 
dissolution (i.e., Continuing/Termination/Litigation/Suspending/Acquisition). LR tests 
were applied and the results were reported in Table 4.6.  
 
Termination was taken as the reference category. Including controls (i.e., 
International and Ratio of firm size) and moderators (i.e., Prior interaction and 
Number of common third parties) failed to significantly improve the model fit. 
Incorporating Misallocation and the two interactions, however, significantly 
improved the goodness-of-fit. The results also revealed that Misallocation was 
significantly and negatively correlated with the continuity of an alliance, but had a 
positive impact on the suspension of a project. As such, compared with a neutral 
termination of an alliance for technical difficulties, the misallocation of marketing 
rights decreases the possibility of continuing a collaboration while increases the 
possibility of suspending a possible fruitful collaboration.  
 
The significantly positive interaction between Misallocation and Prior interaction in 
predicting Acquisition shows that the trust effect mitigates the impact of misallocating 
market rights on the likelihood of integration. The negative interaction between 
Misallocation and Number of common third parties indicates that the reputation effect 
significantly contains the possibility of litigation between partners.  
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Table 4.6 Results of Multinomial Regression  







Ratio of firm size 
 
Prior interaction  
 





Misallocation × Prior 
interaction  
 
Misallocation × # of 



















































































































The reference category is Termination.  
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, 
†






I further explored the impact of Misallocation on each step of research progress. I 
introduced 5 dummy variables to indicate if an alliance proceeded from discovery 
stage to preclinical stage (Dummy 1), from preclinical stage to clinical trial I 
(Dummy 2), from clinical trial I to clinical trial II (Dummy 3), from clinical trial I to 
clinical trial III (Dummy 4), and from clinical trial III to marketing (Dummy 5) 
during 1999-2006, respectively. I coded those dummies as 1 if an alliance 
successfully past the according R&D stage, 0 otherwise. I used binary logistic model 
to study the impact of controls and independent variables on each dummy. Table 4.7 
reports the results.  
  
Table 4.7 Binary Logit Regressions for Each Step of Progress 
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Misallocation is significantly and negatively correlated with Dummy 1, 2, 3, and 4 (χ2 
= 5.192, df =1, p<.05 for Dummy 1; χ2 = 3.017, df =1, p<.05 for Dummy 2; χ2 = 
8.283, df =1, p<.01 for Dummy 3; χ2 = 7.817, df =1, p<.01 for Dummy 4) but is 
insignificantly related to Dummy 5 (χ2 = 2.650, df =1, p>.10). 
 
4.6 Discussion  
 
One key insight of the PRT is that one party should be entitled with the ownership 
when the marginal efficiency of its efforts is significantly larger than that of its 
counterparts‘ (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). However Aghion 
and Tirole (1994) argued that a financially constrained firm may have to give up 
some property rights in exchange for financial support from its sponsors. The actual 
allocation of property rights therefore may deviate from the socially optimal way set 
by the considerations of the marginal efficiency (Lerner and Merges, 1998; Lerner, et 
al., 2003). This deviation accounts for the suboptimal alliance performance. 
Consistent with this theory, by studying 222 alliances in the biopharmaceutical 
industry, I found that the weakened ex ante bargaining power of a biotech firm is 
significantly related to the property right misallocation; such a misallocation causes 
alliances to terminate early and progress slowly. I also found that the negative impact 
of the misallocation of property rights is mitigated in a social environment 
characterized by high trust and strong reputation effect. The impact of property right 
misallocation cannot be examined alone without considering the social environment 
in which an alliance is embedded.  
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Bargaining Power and Property Right Allocation  
 
My analyses identified a strong relationship between the financial strength of a 
biotech firm and the degree of marketing right misallocation. Specifically, biotech 
firms with positive ROE, as well as those possessing significant amount of cash 
reserves are less likely to negotiate away their control of marketing (Table 5). This 
finding confirmed that the financial conditions of a biotech firm affect its ability to 
retain control rights in an alliance. I therefore conclude that the asymmetry of ex ante 
bargaining power significantly affect the allocation of property rights in a negative 
way. A similar result could be found in Lerner and Merges (1998) and Lerner, et al., 
(2003).   
 
Social Context, Property Right Allocation, and Alliance Performance 
 
As predicted by Aghion and Tirole (1994), losing property rights reduces a biotech 
firm‘s incentives to take initiative in a vertical R&D partnership, and hence affect its 
performance negatively. Specifically, I found that biotech-pharmaceutical alliances 
with relatively high degree of misallocating property rights progress slowly and 
dissolve frequently. I also found some evidence that mutual trust and reputation effect 
mitigate the negative impact of misallocating property rights on alliance performance. 
Alliances that inefficiently allocated the property rights proceed faster when the 
partners had interacted with each other before, or when there are relatively a large 
number of indirect channels (i.e., the common third parties).   
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Moreover, previous studies suggest that the social contexts facilitate ex ante 
bargaining progress too. I therefore examine the moderating role of trust and 
reputation effect on Misallocation. The results are reported in Table 4.8.  
 
Table 4.8 Moderating Effects of Social Contexts on Misallocation  

















Ratio of firm size 
 
Number of Common Third 
Parties*ROE 
 
Number of Common Third 





Prior interaction* Inverse of 
survival time 
 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square 



































Link function: Logit  
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and Zaheer, et al. (1998) argued that it is much easier 
for partners to reach an agreement in the presence of mutual goodwill, since much 
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time and energy are saved as trusting partners stop haggling, posturing, and delaying 
agreements in attempts to influence the terms of deals. Moreover, in the presence of 
mutual trust, an agreement is more specified and the unfavorable terms are tolerated 
with satisfaction (Zaheer, et al., 1998). Therefore, a benign social context may 
mitigate the misallocation of property rights caused by asymmetric ex ante bargaining 
power. My analyses show that the biotech-pharmaceutical alliances between partners 
who have interacted with each other before significantly allocated the property right 
better than those who have no history of interaction, ceteris paribus. However, the 
number of common third parties between alliance partners failed to significantly 
affect the bargaining result about allocating property right.     
 
One critic of the PRT is that this theory is only applicable to a rather narrow range of 
phenomena (Williamson, 2000). However, in this chapter I argue that the essence of 
the PRT is considering property rights as sources of investment incentives, and the 
PRT can be applied to explain a wide range of organizational modes rather than just 
―make-or-buy‖ decisions. Moreover, drew from the now popular social context theory, 
I show that the property rights are not the only source of investment incentives. The 
characters of social contexts may increase the sustainability of a so-called informal 
agreement and serve as an alternative to formal contracts to provide incentives. I 
therefore conclude that it is important to include the characters of social contexts in 




Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
Drawing upon the property right theory (PRT), this dissertation attempts to advance 
our understanding of economic organizations. The transaction cost economics (TCE) 
plays a dominant role in explaining a firm‘s boundary choices. However, I propose 
that the predictions of the PRT and those of the TCE differ when trading partners 
have different knowledge bases, decision-making structures, and reward systems. I 
tested the predictions of the PRT and found some support to those predictions by 
examining the governance structures of 285 R&D projects in the biopharmaceutical 
industry. My findings also suggest that organizational contexts (i.e., knowledge bases, 
decision-making structures, and reward systems) play a significant moderating role in 
determining organizational modes of a firm‘s R&D activities.  
 
The PRT suggests that holdups exist in all kinds of organizational modes. The 
allocation of property rights matters in motivating partners of an alliance. The optimal 
way is to assign the property rights to the party whose investments critically affect the 
collective performance of an alliance. However, Aghion and Tirole (1994) pointed 
out that the party with greater bargaining power tends to grab more property rights. 
As a result, the actual allocation of property rights often deviates from the optimal 
way specified by the PRT. I found support for the Aghion-Tirole proposition by 
studying 222 alliances in the biopharmaceutical industry. I also found that prior 
interactions and indirect referral channels between partners contain the negative 
impact of misallocating property rights on alliance performance. I therefore conclude 
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that it is necessary to consider trust and reputation effect in evaluating the impact of 




While there has been clear theoretical and empirical progress in our understanding of 
economic organizations, important gaps remain (Poppo and Zanger, 1998; 
Williamson, 2000; Gibbons, 2005; Carter and Hodgeson, 2006). The TCE has 
focused primarily on the imperfections of market and the virtues of hierarchy 
(Holmström and Roberts, 1998; Whinston, 2003; Gibbons, 2005), but such a focus on 
explaining vertical integration seems somewhat misplaced given the apparent trends 
toward disintegration, downsizing, and refocusing (Poppo and Zanger, 1998). A 
complete theory of firm requires a deeper understanding of the organizational cost—
cost that restrains a firm‘s capacity to internally bundle capabilities and activities 
(Poppo and Zanger, 1998; Holmström and Roberts, 1998; Whinston, 2003; Gibbons, 
2005). Poppo and Zanger called for further works that ―extend our understanding of 
how, when, and why markets and hierarchies are discretely different‖, and ―[w]hat 
impedes hierarchies from fully replicating markets internally or markets from 
adopting vast elements of hierarchical control?‖ (1998: 874).  
 
Answering this call, my dissertation explores the cost of hierarchy, and suggests that 
acquisitions may lead to hierarchical failures when heterogeneity between two 
organizations impedes a smooth transfer of ownerships. The PRT suggests that 
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integration means transferring property rights from one party to another and the party 
who loses property rights loses its incentives as well. Integration therefore incurs 
costs (Grossman and Hart, 1986). I argued that such a cost is significant when the 
differences in the knowledge bases, the decision making structures, and the reward 
systems between organizations prevent an acquirer from effectively monitoring and 
motivating an acquiree. Under high-difference circumstances, a firm may gain from 
resisting the temptation of acquiring its counterpart.  
 
I argued that the PRT may as well be applied to explain governance structures of 
transactions other than the ―make-or-buy‖ choices. I showed that the allocation of 
property rights between alliance partners significantly affected the outcomes of an 
R&D alliance. Moreover, consistent with previous literature, I proposed that mutual 
trust and reputation effect help to improve alliance performance, given a specific 
allocation of property rights. Gulati (1995) argued that a history of interactions breeds 
mutual trust between partners and trust substitutes formal contracts to contain 
opportunisms. Kreps (1990), Raub and Weesie (1990), and Kandori (1992) suggested 
that the concerns of reputation promote cooperation. I argued that studying the impact 
of allocating property rights on alliance performance without incorporating the effects 
of trust and reputation may yield misleading results.  
 
This dissertation conveys important messages to managers. Managers need to be well 
aware of integration cost associated with merging unrelated knowledge bases, 
incompatible decision-making structures, and different reward systems between two 
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organizations. When such a cost is considerable, a firm may be better off to 
collaborate rather than acquire its partner. Moreover, managers can rely on informal 
agreements as alternatives for costly formal instruments to facilitate collaborations. 
To make such informal agreements credible, managers need to foster mutual trust 
across organizations. A threat of bad-mouthing a partner through multiple referral 
channels may deter defections from an informal agreement as well.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
My choice of the empirical setting in the biopharmaceutical industry raises several 
theoretical and methodological issues. Such a boundary specification facilitates my 
study as R&D activities in this industry are subject to high transaction costs and 
participating firms show significant heterogeneity. However, the biopharmaceutical 
industry is characterized by rapid technological advancements and hence firms have 
to actively shift their boundaries to cope with the high environmental uncertainty. 
This setting is considerably different from those rather stable industries, in which 
firms may have different concerns. Future research would include both within- and 
cross-industry data for more generalizable conclusions.  
 
Another arena for future research could be addressing informal agreements between 
firms directly. Informal agreements are often talked but seldom studied because those 
agreements are by definition unobservable for outsiders. Studies that address informal 
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agreements through first-hand information collection may substantially advance our 
understanding of organizations. 
 
 I used a simple count measure for trust. However, trust could itself vary on several 
dimensions (McAllister, 1995; Mayer, et al., 1995). Developing an index to measure 
the various dimensions of trust and relate it to the establishment of formal and 
informal contracts would be another fruitful direction for future research. Another 
possible line of inquiry would be a finer-grained analysis of control rights associated 
with product development, manufacturing, and litigation, rather than focusing on 
rights of marketing only. Such an improvement allows a more accurate assessment of 




Aggarwal, Rajesh and Andrew Samwick, 1999 ―The Other Side of the Tradeoff: The 
Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation.‖ Journal of Political Economy, 
107(1): 65-105. 
 
Aggarwal, Rajesh K., and Andrew Samwick, 2003. ―Performance Incentives Within 
Firms: The Effect of Managerial Responsibility.‖ Journal of Finance, 58(4): 1613–
1650.  
 
Aghion, Philippe, Nick Bloom, Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith, and Peter Howitt, 
2005 ―Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship.‖ The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. 120 (2): 701-728. 
 
Aghion, Philippe, Rachel Griffith, and Peter Howitt. 2005 ―Vertical Integration and 
Competition.‖ American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings. 96(2): 97-
102. 
 
Aghion, Philippe, and Jean Tirole. 1994 ―The Management of Innovation.‖ The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 109: 1185-1209. 
 
Ahuja, Gautam, 2000 ―Collaboration Networks, Structure Holes, and Innovation: A 
Longitudinal Study.‖ Administrative Science Quarterly. 45(3): 425-455.  
 
Ahuja, Gautam, and Riitta Katila. 2001 ―Technological Acquisitions and the 
Innovation Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Longitudinal Study.‖ Strategic 
Management Journal, 22: 197–220. 
 
Ahuja, Gautam, and Riitta Katila. 2004 ―Where do Resources Come From? The Role 
of Idiosyncratic Situations.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 25: 887–907. 
 
Anderson, Erin, 1985 ―The Salesperson as Outside Agent or Employee: A 
Transaction Cost Analysis.‖ Marketing Science. 4 (3): 234-254. 
 
Anderson, Erin, 1988 ―Transaction Costs as Determinants of Opportunism in 
Integrated and Independent Sales Forces.‖ Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization. 9: 247-264. 
 
Anderson, Erin and David C. Schmittlein, 1984 ―Integration of the Sales Force: An 
Empirical Examination.‖ RAND Journal of Economics. 15 (3): 385-395.  
 
Aoki, Keith, 1996 ―(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes toward a Cultural 
Geography of Authorship.‖ Stanford Law Review, 48 (5): 1293-1355. 
 
Argyres, N. 1996 ―Evidence on the Role of Firm Capabilities in Vertical Integration 
Decisions.‖ Strategic Management Journal, 17: 129-150. 
 133 
 
Arora, Ashish, and Alfonso Gambardella. 1990 ―Complementarity and External 
Linkages: The Strategies of the Large Firms in Biotechnology.‖ The Journal of 
Industrial Economics. 38(4): 361-379.  
 
Asquith, P. and D. Mullins, 1986 ―Equity Issues and Offering Dilution,‖ Journal of 
Financial Economics, 61-89. 
Azoulay, Pierre. 2004 ―Capturing Knowledge within and across Firm Boundaries: 
Evidence from Clinical Development.‖ The American Economic Review. 94 (5): 
1591-1612. 
 
Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. 2002 ―Relational Contracts 
and the Theory of the Firm.‖ The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 117: 39-84. 
 
Baker, George, and Thomas Hubbard. 2006 ―Contractibility and Asset Ownership: 
On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking‖. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics. 119(4): 1443-1479. 
 
Balakrishnan, Srinivasan and Birger Wernerfelt, 1986 ―Technical Change, 
Competition and Vertical Integration.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 7(1): 347-
359. 
 
Baum, Joel A., Tony Calavrese, and Brian S. Silverman, 2000 ―Don‘t Go It Alone: 
Alliance Network Composition and Startups‘ Performance in Canadian 
Biotechnology.‖ Strategic Management Journal. Special Issue: Strategic 
Networks. 21(2): 267-294.   
 
Bryk, A.S., and S. W. Raudenbush, 1992. Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications 
and Data Analysis Methods. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Brynjolfsson, Erik, 1994 ―Information Assets, Technology, and Organization.‖ 
Management Science. 40 (12): 1645-1662.  
 
Beamish, Paul W., 1987 ―Joint Ventures in LDCs: Partner Selection and 
Performance.‖ Management International Review. 27: 23-37. 
 
Berger, P.G. and E. Ofek. 1995 ―Diversification‘s Effect on Firm Value.‖ Journal of 
Financial Economics. 37: 39–65. 
 
Bishop, Y. M., S. E. Fienberg, and P. W. Holland, 1975 ―Discrete Multivariate 
Analysis: Theory and Practice,‖ Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
Bradach, J. L. and R. G. Eccles, 1989 ―Price, Authority, and Trust: From Ideal Types 
to Plural Forms.‖ Annual Review of Sociology, 15: 97-118. 
 
 134 
Bull, Clive. 1987 ―The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts,‖ The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102: 147-159. 
 
Bucklin Louis P., and Sanjit Sengupta, 1993 ―Organizing Successful Co-Marketing 
Alliances,‖ Journal of Marketing. 57(2): 32-46. 
 
Burt, R.S. and M. Knez. 1995 ―Kinds of Third-Party Effects on Trust.‖ Rationality 
and Society. 7: 255-292. 
 
Cardinal, Laura, B., 2001 ―Technological Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: 
The Use of Organizational Control in Managing Research and Development.‖ 
Organization Science. 12(1): 19-36. 
 
Carpon, Laurence, Will Mitchell, and Anand Swaminathan, 2001 ―Asset Divestiture 
following Horizontal Acquisitions: A Dynamic View.‖ Strategic Management 
Journal. 22: 817–844. 
 
Carter, Richard, and Geoffery M. Hodgson. 2006 ―The Impact of Empirical Tests of 
Transaction Cost Economics on the Debate on the Nature of the Firm.‖ Strategic 
Management Journal. 27: 461–476. 
 
Chatterjee, Sayan, 1992 ―Source of Value in Takeover: Synergy or Restructuring-
Implications for Target and Bidder Firms.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 13(4): 
267-286.  
 
Cohen, Wesley M., and Daniel A. Levinthal, 1990 ―Absorptive Capacity: A New 
Perspective on Lerning and Innovation.‖ Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1): 
128-152. 
 
Coles, Jerilyn W. and William S. Hesterly, 1998 ―The Impact of Firm-Specific Assets 
and the Interaction of Uncertainty: An Examination of Make or Buy Decisions in 
Public and Private Hospitals.‖ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 36: 
383-409. 
   
Cusumano, Michael, and Akira Takeishi. 1991 ―Supplier Relations and Management: 
A Survey of Japanese, Japanese-Transplant, and U.S. Auto Plants.‖ Strategic 
Management Journal, 12: 563-88. 
 
Coase, Ronald, 1937 ―The Nature of the Firm.‖ Economica. 4: 386-405. 
 
Colombo, Massimo G., 2003 ―Alliance Form: A Test of the Contractual and 
Competence Perspectives.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 24: 1209–1229. 
 
Das, Somnath, Pradyot K. Sen, and Sanjit Sengupta, 1998 ―Impact of Strategic 




Das, T. K., and Bing-Sheng Teng, 1998 ―Between Trust and Control: Developing 
Confidence in Partner Cooperation in Alliances.‖ Academy of Management 
Review. 23(3): 491-512. 
 
Datta, Deepak K., 1991 ―Organizational Fir and Acquisition Performance: Effects of 
Post-Acquisition Integration.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 12(4): 281-297. 
 
David, Robert J. and Shin-Kap Han 2004 ―A Systematic Assessment of the Empirical 
Support for Transaction Cost Economics.‖  Strategic Management Journal. 25: 
39-58.  
 
De Fontenay, Catherine C., and Joshua S. Gans. 2005 ―Vertical Integration in the 
Presence of Upstream Competition,‖ The RAND Journal of Economics. 36(3): 
544-572. 
 
DiMasi, Joseph A., 2000 ―New Drug Innovation and Pharmaceutical Industry 
Structure: Trends in the Output of Pharmaceutical Firms.‖ Drug Information 
Journal. 34: 1169-1194. 
 
Dyer, Jeffery H., 1996 ―How Chrysler Created an American Keiretsu.‖ Harvard 
Business Review. 74: 42-56. 
 
Dyer, Jeffery H.. 1997 ―Effective Interfirm Collaboration: How Firms Minimize 
Transaction Costs and Maximize Transaction Value.‖ Strategic Management 
Journal. 18: 535-556. 
 
Dyer, Jeffery H., and Harbir Singh. 1998 ―The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy 
and Sources of Interorganizational Competitive Advantage.‖ Academy of 
Management Review. 23(4): 660-679. 
 
Eisenberg, R.S., 1996, ‗Public Research and Private Development: Patents and 
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research‘, Virginia Law Review, 
36: 691-719.  
 
Elfenbein, Daniel W. and Josh Lerner. 2003 ―Ownership and Control Rights in 
Internet Portal Alliances, 1995-1999.‖ The RAND Journal of Economics. 34(2): 
356-369 
 
Erramilli, M. Krishna, and C. P. Rao, 1993 ―Service Firms‘ International Entry Mode 
Choice: A Modified Transaction Cost Approach.‖ Journal of Marketing. 57(July): 
19-38. 
 
Evans, David S., and Sanford J. Grossman, 1983 ―Integration‖ in David S. Evans 




Fey, C.F. and Paul Beamish. 2000 ‗Joint Venture Conflict: The Case of Russian 
International Joint Ventures‘, International Business Review, 9(2):139-60. 
 
Filson, Darren and Rosa Morales, 2006 ―Equity Links and Information Acquisition in 
Biotechnology Alliances.‖ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 59: 1–
28. 
 
Fienberg, S. E. 1980, The Analysis of Cross-Classified Categorical Data (2d ed.). 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
Folta, Timothy B., 1998 ―Governance and Uncertainty: The Trade-Off between 
Administrative Control and Commitment.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 
19(11): 1007-1028. 
 
Fors G., 1997. ―Utilization of R&D results in the home and foreign plants of 
multinationals,‖ Journal of Industrial Economics, XLV(2): 341-358.  
 
Gans, Joshua S., David H. Hsu, and Scott Stern, 2002 ―When does Start-Up 
Innovation Spur the Gale of Creative Destruction?‖ The RAND Journal of 
Economics. 33(4): 571-586. 
 
Gatignon, Hubert and Erin Anderson, 1988 ―The Multinational Corporation‘s Degree 
of Control over Foreign Subsidiaries: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost 
Explanation.‖ Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. 4(2): 305-336. 
 
Gerpott, T. J. 1995 ―Successful Integration of R&D Functions after Acquisitions: An 
Exploratory Study.‖ R&D Management, 25: 161-178. 
 
Gibbons, Robert. 2005 ―Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?‖ Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization. 58: 200-245.  
 
Giovannetti, G. T. and S. W. Morrison. 2000 Convergence: The Biotechnology 
Industry Report. Ernst & Young, Palo Alto, CA. 
 
Gittelman, M. and Bruce, Kogut, 2003. ―Does Good Science Lead to Valuable 
Knowledge? Biotechnology Firms and the Evolutionary Logic of Citation 
Patterns,‖ Management Science, 49: 366-382. 
 
Gompers, P. A., and Josh Lerner. 1996 ―The Use of Covenants: An Empirical 
Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements.‖ Journal of Law and Economics. 
36:463-498.  
 
Granovetter, Mark. 1985 ―Economic Action and Social Structure: A Theory of 
Embeddedness.‖ American Journal of Sociology. 91(3): 481-510. 
 
 137 
Grant, Robert M., 1996 ―Toward a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm.‖ Strategic 
Management Journal. 17, Special Issue: Knowledge and the Firm: 109-122.  
 
Grossman, Martin. 2003 Entrepreneurship in Biotechnology: Managing for Growth 
from Start-Up to Initial Public Offering. Physica-Verlag Heidelberg: New York. 
 
Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver Hart. 1986 ―The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: 
A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration.‖ Journal of Political Economy. 94: 
691-719. 
 
Gulati, Ranjay. 1995 ―Social Structure and Alliance Formation Pattern: A 
Longitudinal Analysis.‖ Administrative Science Quarterly. 40(4):619-652. 
 
Gulati, Ranjay. 1998 ―Alliances and Networks.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 19: 
293-317. 
 
Gulati, Ranjay. 1999 ―Network Location and Learning: The Influence of Network 
Resources and Firm Capabilities on Alliance Formation.‖ Strategic Management 
Journal. 20(5): 397-420. 
 
Gulati, Ranjay, Paul R. Lawrence, and Phanish Puranam, 2005 ―Adaptation in 
Vertical Relationships: Beyond Incentive Conflict.‖ Strategic Management 
Journal. 26: 415-440. 
 
Gulati, Ranjay, and Harbir Singh. 1998 ―The Architecture of Cooperation: Managing 
Coordination Costs and Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances.‖ 
Administrative Science Quarterly. 43: 781-814. 
 
Halonen, Maija. 2002 ―Reputation and the Allocation of Ownership.‖ The Economic 
Journal. 112(July): 539-558. 
 
Hannan, M. T. and J. Freeman, 1984. ―Structural Inertia and Organizational Change.‖ 
American Sociological Review, 49(2): 149-164. 
 
Hart, Oliver, and John Moore. 1990 ―Property Rights and the Nature of Firm.‖ 
Journal of Political Economy. 98: 1119-1158. 
 
Harrigan, Kathryn R. 1988. ―Strategic Alliances and Partner Asymmetries.‖ In F. 
Contractor, P. Lorange, (Eds.) Cooperative Strategies in International Business. 
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
 
Hart, Oliver, 1995 Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. Oxford : Clarendon 
Press; New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hart, Oliver, and John Moore. 1990 ―Property Rights and the Nature of Firm.‖ 
Journal of Political Economy. 98: 1119-1158. 
 138 
Haspeslagh, P. and D. B. Jemison, 1991. Managing Acquisitions. New York: Free 
Press.  
 
Hauck, J. R., and A. Donner, 1977. ―Wald's Test as Applied to Hypotheses in Logit 
Analysis,‖ Journal of the American Statistical Association, 72: 851-853.  
 
Hauffman, Allen, Craig H. Wood, and Gregory Theyel, 2000 ―Collaboration and 
Technology Linkages: A Strategic Supplier Typology.‖ Strategic Management 
Journal. 21: 649-663.  
 
Hayek, F. A. 1945. ―The Use of Knowledge in Society.‖ American Economic Review. 
35: 519-30. 
 
Henderson, Rebecca and Iain Cockburn, 1996 ―Scale, Scope, and Spillovers: The 
Determinants of Research Productivity in Drug Discovery.‖ The RAND Journal of 
Economics. 27(1): 32-59.  
 
Hennart, Jean-Francois, 1991 ―The Transaction Cost Theory of Joint Ventures: An 
Empirical Study of Japanese Subsidiaries in the United States‖. Management 
Science. 37(4): 483-497.  
 
Holmström, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom. 1991. ―Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: 
Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design.‖ Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization 7:24-52.  
 
Holmström, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom. 1994. ―The Firm as an Incentive System.‖ 
American Economic Review 84: 972-91.  
 
Holmström, Bengt and Jean Tirole, 1991 ―Transfer Pricing and Organizational 
Form.‖ Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. 7(2): 201-228. 
 
Holmström, Bengt and John Roberts, 1998 ―The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited.‖ 
The Journal of Economic Perspectives. 12(4): 73-94.  
 
Hubbard, R.G., and R.J. Weiner, 1991 ―Efficient Contracting and Market Power: 
Evidence from U.S. Natural Gas Industry.‖ Journal of Law and Economics, 34: 
25-67. 
 
Ivancevich, J. M., D. M. Schweiger, and F. R. Power, 1987 ―Strategies for Managing 
Human Resources during Mergers and Acquisitions.‖ Human Resource Planning. 
10(1):19-35. 
 
Javidan, M., R.J. House, and P.W. Dorfman, 2004, ―A Nontechnical Summary of 
GLOBE Findings.‖, in R.J. House, P.J. Hanges, M. Javidan, P.W. Dorfman, and 
V. Gupta, (Eds), Culture, Leadership and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 
Societies, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, . 
 139 
 
Jensen, Michael, and Wiiliam Meckling. 1976 ―Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.‖ Journal of Financial 
Economics 3: 305-360.  
 
John, George, and Barton A. Weitz, 1988 ―Forward Integration into Distribution: An 
Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Analysis.‖ Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization 4: 337-355. 
 
Jones, Gareth R., 1987. ―Organization-Client Transactions and Organizational 
Governance Structures.‖ Academy of Management Journal. 30 (2): 197-218. 
 
Joskow, Paul L. 1988 ―Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: 
Empirical Evidence.‖ Journal of Law, Economics & Organization. 4: 95-117. 
 
Kale, Prashant, Jeffery H. Dyer, and Harbir Singh. 2002 ―Alliance Capabilities, Stock 
Market Response, and Long-Term Alliance Success: The Role of the Alliance 
Function.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 23: 747-767.  
 
Kandori, Michihiro. 1992 ―Social Norms and Community Enforcement.‖ Review of 
Economic Studies. 59: 63-80. 
 
Klein, Benjamin, Robert Crawford, and Armen Alchian. 1978 ―Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process.‖ Journal of Law 
and Economics. 21: 297-326. 
 
Klein, Saul, Gary L. Frazier, and Victor J. Roth, 1990 ―A Transaction Cost Analysis 
Model of Channel Integration in International Markets.‖ Journal of Marketing 
Research. 27: 196-208. 
 
Kogut, Bruce. 1988 ―Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives.‖ 
Strategic Management Journal. 9: 319-332. 
 
Kogut, Bruce. 1991 ―Joint Ventures and the Option to Expand and Acquire.‖ 
Management Science, 37 (1):19-33. 
 
Kogut, Bruce, W. Shan and G. Walker. 1992 ―The Make-or-Cooperate Decision in 
the Context of an Industry Network.‖ In N. Nohria and R. Eccles (Eds.) Networks 
and Organizations. 348-365. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.  
 
Kogut, Bruce and Udo Zander, 1992 ―Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative 




Kreps, David M. 1990 ―Corporate Culture and Economic Theory.‖ In J. Alt and K. 
Shepsle (Eds.) Perspectives in Positive Political Economy. 90-143. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.   
 
Kumar, M. V. Shyam, 2005 ―The Value from Acquiring and Divesting a Joint 
Venture: A Real Options Approach.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 26: 321–
331. 
 
Lane, Peter J. and M. Lubatkin, 1998 ―Relative Absorptive Capacity and 
Interorganizational Learning.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 19: 461-477. 
 
Lane, Peter J., Jane E. Silk, and Marjorie A. Lyles, 2002 ―Absorptive Capacity, 
Learning, and Performance in International Joint Ventures,‖ Strategic 
Management Journal. 22: 1139–1161. 
 
Lang, Larry H. P., and Rene M. Stulz, 1994 ―Tobin's q, Corporate Diversification, 
and Firm Performance.‖ Journal of Political Economy. 102(6): 1248-1280. 
 
Larsson, Rikard and Sydney Finkelstein, 1999 ―Integrating Strategic, Organizational, 
and Human Resource Perspectives on Merger and Acquisitions: A Case Survey of 
Synergy Realization.‖ Organization Science. 10 (1): 1-26. 
 
Leiblein, Michael J., Jeffery J. Reuer, and Frederic Dalsace, 2002 ―Do Make or Buy 
Decisions Matter? The Influence of Organizational Governance on Technological 
Performance.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 23: 817-833.  
 
Lerner, Josh, and Robert Merges. 1998 ―The Control of Technology Alliances: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Biotechnology Industry.‖ The Journal of Industrial 
Economics. 46: 125-156. 
 
Lerner, Josh, Hilary Shane, and Alexander Tsai, 2003 ―Do Equity Financing Cycles 
Matter? Evidence from Biotechnology Alliances.‖ Journal of Financial 
Economics. 67: 411–446. 
 
Levy, David T., 1985 ―The Transaction Cost Approach to Vertical Integration: An 
Empirical Examination.‖ Review of Economics and Statistics.67: 438-445. 
 
Lichtenberg, Frank R. and Tomas J. Philipson, 2003 ―The Dual Effects of Intellectual 
Property Regulations: Within and Between- Patent Competition in the U.S. 
Pharmaceutical Industry.‖ Journal of Law and Economics, XLV: 643-672. 
 
Liebeman, Marvin B., 1991 ―Determinants of Vertical Integration: An Empirical 
Test.‖ Journal of Industrial Economics. 39: 451-66. 
 
Luo, Yadong, 2002 ―Contract, Cooperation, and Performance in International Joint 
Ventures,‖ Strategic Management Journal.23: 903–919. 
 141 
 
Lyons, Bruce R., 1995 ―Specific Investment, Economies of Scale, and the Make-or-
Buy Decision: A Test of Transaction Cost Theory.‖ Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization. 26: 431-443. 
 
Mang, Paul Y., 1998 ―Exploiting Innovation Options: An Empirical Analysis of 
R&D-Intensive Firms.‖ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 35: 229-
242. 
 
Masten, Scott E., 1984 ―The Organization of Production: Evidence from the 
Aerospace Industry.‖ Journal of Law and Economics, 27:403-417. 
 
Masten, Scott E., James W. Meehan, and Edward A Snyder, 1989 ―Vertical 
Integration in the U.S. Auto Industry: A Note on the Influence of Specific 
Assets.‖ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 12: 265-73. 
 
Masten, Scott E., 2002 ―Modern Evidence on the Firm.‖ The American Economic 
Review. 92(2): 428-432. 
 
Masten, Scott E., James W. Meehan Jr., and Edward A. Snyder, 1989 ―Vertical 
Integration in the U.S. Auto Industry: A Note on the Influence of Specific 
Assets.‖ Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 12: 265-273. 
 
Masten, Scott E., James W. Meehan Jr., and Edward A. Snyder, 1991 ―The Costs of 
Organization.‖ Journal of Law,Economics and Organization 7(1-25). 
 
Masulis, R. and A. Korwar, 1986 ―Seasoned Equity Offerings: An Empirical 
Investigation,‖ Journal of Financial Economics. 15: 91-118. 
 
Mayer, Roger C., James H. Davis, and F. David Schoorman, 1995 ―An Integrative 
Model of Organizational Trust.‖ Academy of Management Review. 20 (3): 709-
734. 
 
McAllister, Daniel J., 1995 ―Affect- and Cognition-Based Trust as Foundations for 
Interpersonal Cooperation in Organizations.‖ Academy of Management Journal. 
38 (1): 24-59. 
 
Menard, C. 2004 ―The Economics of Hybrid Organizations.‖ Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics. 160(3): 345–376. 
 
Meyer, Margaret, Paul Iblilgrom, and John Roberts, 1992 "Organizational Prospects, 
Influence Costs and Ownership Changes," Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy, 1, 9-35. 
 
 142 
Michael, Steven C., 1994 ―Competition in Organizational Form: Mail Order versus 
Retail Stores, 1910-1940.‖ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 23: 
269-286.  
 
Mitchell, Will, and Kulwant Singh. 1996 ―Business Survival of Firms Using Hybrid 
Relationships in the American Hospital Software Systems Industry, 1961-1991.‖ 
Strategic Management Journal 17(3): 169-195. 
 
Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. 1988 ―An Economic Approach to Influence 
Activities in Organizations.‖ American Journal of Sociology 94: 154-179.  
 
Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. 1990. ―Bargaining costs, influence costs, and the 
organization of economic activity.‖ Chapter 3 in J. Alt and K. Shepsle (eds.), 
Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. 1992 Economics, Organization and Management. 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. 
 
Mikkelson, Wayne H. and M. Megan Partch, 1986 ―Valuation Effects of Security 
Offerings and the Issuance Process.‖ Journal of Financial Economics. 15: 31-60.  
 
Mizruchi, M.S. 1992 The Structure of Corporate Political Action. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Monteverde, Kirk, 1995 ―Technical Dialog as an Incentive for Vertical Integration in 
the Semiconductor Industry.‖ Management Science, 41(10): 1624-1638. 
 
Monteverde, Kirk, and David Teece, 1982 ―Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical 
Integration in the Automobile Industry," Bell Journal of Economics. 13, 206-213. 
 
Nicholson, Sean, Patricia M. Danzon, and Jeffrey McCullough. 2005 ―Biotech-
Pharmaceutical Alliances as a Signal of Asset and Firm Quality.‖ The Journal of 
Business. 78 (4): 1433-1464. 
 
O‘rourke, Maureen A., 2000 ―Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law.‖ 
Columbia Law Review. 100 (5): 1177-1250. 
 
Ofek, B and D. Yermack, 2000 ―Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the 
Evolution of Managerial Ownership,‖ Journal of Finance, LV(3), 1367-1384. 
 
Osborn, Richard N. and John Hagedoorn. 1997 ―The Institutionalization and 
Evolutionary Dynamics of Interorganizational Alliances and Networks.‖ The 
Academy of Management Journal. Special Research Forum on Alliances and 
Networks. 40(2): 261-278. 
 
 143 
Owen-Smith, Jason, and Walter W. Powell, 2004 ―Knowledge Networks as Channels 
and Conduits: The Effects of Spillovers in the Boston Biotechnology 
Community.‖ Organization Science. 15(1): 5-21.  
 
Oxley, Joanne E. 1997 ―Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic 
Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach.‖ Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization. 13(2): 387-409. 
 
Oxley, Joanne E. 1999 ―Institutional Environment and the Mechanisms of 
Governance: The Impact of Intellectual Property Protection on the Structure of 
Inter-Firm Alliances.‖ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 38: 283-
309. 
 
Oxley, Joanne E., and Rachelle Sampson. 2004 ―The Scope and Governance of 
International R&D Alliances.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 25: 723–749. 
 
Pablo, A.L., 1994 ―Determinants of Acquisition Integration Level: A Decision-
Making Perspective.‖ Academy of Management Journal, 37 (4): 803-836. 
 
Park, Seung Ho, and Michael V. Russo, 1996 ―When Competition Eclipses 
Cooperation: An Event History Analysis of Alliance Failure.‖ Management 
Science. 42: 875-890. 
 
Park, Seung Ho, and Gerardo R. Ungson, 1997 ―The Effect of Partner Nationality, 
Organizational Dissimilarity, and Economic Motivation on the Dissolution of 
Joint Ventures.‖ The Academy of Management Journal. 39: 279-307. 
 
Park, Seung Ho, and Gerardo R. Ungson. 2001 ―Interfirm Rivalry and Managerial 
Complexity: A Conceptual Framework for Alliance Failure.‖ Organization 
Science, 12 (1): 37-53.  
 
Parkhe, Arvind. 1993 ―Strategic Alliance Structuring: A Game Theoretic and 
Transaction Cost Examination of Interfirm Cooperation.‖ The Academy of 
Management Journal. 36(4):794-829.  
 
Penner-Hann, Joan, and J. Myles Shaver, 2005 ―Does International Research and 
Development Increase Patent Output? An Analysis of Japanese Pharmaceutical 
Firms.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 26: 121–140.  
 
Phene, Anupama, Karin Fladmoe-Lindquist, and Laurence Marsh, 2006 
―Breakthrough Innovations in the U.S. Biotechnology Industry: The Effects of 




Pisano, Gary P. 1990 ―The R&D Boundaries of the Firm: An Empirical Analysis.‖ 
Administrative Science Quarterly. Special Issue: Technology, Organizations, and 
Innovation. 35(1): 153-176. 
 
Pisano, Gary. 1997. ―R&D Performance, Collaborative Arrangements, and the 
Market-for Know-How: A Test of the ‗Lemons‘ Hypothesis in Biotechnology.‖ 
Mimeo. 
 
Pisano, Gary P., 1989 ―Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence 
from the Biotechnology Industry.‖ Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. 
5(1): 109-126.  
 
Pisano, Gary P., and Mang P.Y., 1993 ―Collaborative Product Development and the 
Market for Know-How: Strategies and Structures in the Biotechnology Industry.‖ 
Research on Technological Innovation, Management and Policy. 5: 109-136. 
 
Pisano, Gary P., Michael V. Russo, and David J. Teece. 1988 ―Joint Ventures and 
Collaborative Agreements in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry.‖ In 
David Mowery (Ed.) International Collaborative Ventures in U.S. Manufacturing: 
23-70. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.  
 
Podolny, J. M. 1994 ―Market Uncertainty and the Social Character of Economic 
Exchange.‖ Administrative Science Quarterly. 39: 458-483. 
 
Poppo, Laura and Todd Zenger, 1998 ―Testing Alternative Theories of the Firm: 
Transaction Cost, Knowledge-Based, and Measurement Explanations for Make-
or-Buy Decisions in Information Services.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 19: 
853-877. 
 
Portes, Alejandro and Julia Sensenbrenner, 1993 ―Embeddedness and Immigration: 
Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action1.‖ American Journal of 
Sociology 98(6):1320-1350. 
 
Powell, Walter and Peter Brantley, 1992 ―Competitive Cooperation in Biotechnology: 
Learning through Networks?" in N. Nohria and R. Eccles, eds., Networks and 
Organizations. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Powell, Walter W., Kenneth W. Koput, and Laurel Smith-Doerr, 1996 
―Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of 
Learning in Biotechnology.‖ Administrative Science Quarterly. 41(1): 116-145. 
 
Rajan, Raghuram G., and Luigi Zingales. 1998 ―Power in a Theory of the Firm.‖ The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 113: 387-432. 
 
Raub, W. and J. Weesie. 1990 ―Reputation and Efficiency in Social Interactions: An 
example of Network Effects.‖ American Journal of Sociology. 96: 626-654. 
 145 
 
Ranft, Annette L. and Michael D. Lord, 2002 ―Acquiring New Technologies and 
Capabilities: A Grounded Model of Acquisition Implementation.‖ Organization 
Science. 13(4): 420-441. 
 
Reuter, Jeffery J., Maurizio Zollo, and Harbir Singh, 2002 ―Post-Formation 
Dynamics in Strategic Alliances.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 23: 135–151. 
 
Rindfleisch, Aric and Jan B. Heide, 1997 ―Transaction Cost Analysis: Past, Present, 
and Future Applications.‖ Journal of Marketing, 61(4): 30-54.  
 
Ring, Peter Smith and Andrew H. Van de Van, 1992 ―Structuring Cooperative 
Relationships between Organizations.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 13 (7): 
483-498. 
 
Robertson, Thomas and Hubert Gatignon, 1998 ―Technology Development Mode: A 
Transaction Cost Conceptualization.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 19 (6): 515-
532. 
 
Roijakkers, Nadine and John Hagedoorn, 2006 ―Inter-Firm R&D Partnering in 
Pharmaceutical Biotechnology Since 1975: Trends, Patterns, and Networks.‖ 
Research Policy. 35: 431-446. 
 
Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Patrick W. Schmitz. 2003 ―Optimal allocation of 
ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances.‖ Games and Economic Behavior. 43: 
153–173. 
 
Rothaermel, Frank T. and David L. Deeds, 2004 ―Exploration and Exploitation 
Alliances in Biotechnology: A System of New Product Development.‖ Strategic 
Management Journal. 25: 201–221. 
 
Sampson, Rachelle C., 2004 ―The Cost of Misaligned Governance in R&D 
Alliances.‖  Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. 20 (2): 484-526. 
 
Santoro, Michael D., and Joseph P. Mcgill, 2005 ―The Effects of Uncertainty and 
Asset Co-Specialization on Governance in Biotechnology Alliances.‖ Strategic 
Management Journal. 26: 1261–1269. 
 
Sapienza, Alice M., Diana Stork, and Joseph G. Lombardino, 2001 Leading 
Biotechnology Alliances: Right from the Start. New York: Wiley-Liss.  
 
Scharfstein, David, and Jeremy Stein. 2000 ―The Dark Side of Internal Capital 
Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment.‖ Journal of 
Finance. 55(December): 2537-2564. 
 
Scherer, F. M. 1993. ―Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry.‖ The Journal of Economic Perspectives. 7 (3): 97-115. 
 146 
 
Schilling, Melissa A. and H. Kevin Steensma, 2002 ―Disentangling the Theories of 
the Firm Boundaries: A Path Model and Empirical Test.‖ Organization Science. 
13(4): 387-401.  
 
Schlesselman, James J. 1982, Case-Control Studies: Design, Conduct, Analysis, New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Schweiger, David M., R.J. Ridley, and D. Marini, 1991 ―Creating One from Two: 
The Merger between Harris Semiconductor and General Electric Solid State.‖ In 
Jackson, S.E. (Ed.) Working through diversity: Human resources initiative. New 
York: Guilford. 
 
Schweiger, David M. and Philip K. Goulet, 2005 ―Facilitating Acquisition Integration 
Through Deep-Level Cultural Learning Interventions: A Longitudinal Field 
Experiment.‖ Organization Studies. 26(10): 1477–1499. 
 
Schweizer, Lars, 2005 ―Organizational Integration of Acquired Biotechnology 
Companies into Pharmaceutical Companies: The Need for a Hybrid Approach.‖ 
Academy of Management Journal. 48(6): 1051–1074. 
 
Seabright, M. A., D. A. Levinthal, and M. Fichman, 1992. ―Role of Individual 
Attachments in the Dissolution of Interorganizational Relationships,‖ Academy of 
Management Journal, 35: 122-160. 
 
Shan, Weijan, Gordon Walker, and Bruce Kogut, 1994 ―Interfirm Cooperation and 
Startup Innovation in the Biotechnology Industry.‖ Strategic Management 
Journal. 15(5): 387-394. 
 
Shelanski, Howard A., and Peter G. Klein. 1995 ―Empirical Research in Transaction 
Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment.‖ Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization. 11: 335-361. 
 
Simon, Herbert A., 1961 Administrative Behavior. 2
nd
 ed. New York: Macmillan. 
Original publication: 1947. 
 
Singh, Kulwant, and Will Michell, 2005 ―Growth Dynamics: The Bidirectional 
Relationship between Interfirm Collaboration and Business Sales in Entrant and 
Incumbent Alliances.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 26: 497–521. 
 
Spilfer, Pablo, 1985 ―On Vertical Mergers.‖ Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization 1: 285-312. 
 
Sobrero, Maurizio, and Edward B. Roberts, 2001 ―The Trade-Off between Efficiency 
and Learning in Interorganizational Relationships for Product Development.‖ 
Management Science. 47(4): 493-511. 
 147 
 
Steensma, H. Kevin, and Kevin G. Corley, 2000 ―On the Performance of 
Technology-Sourcing Partnerships: The Interaction between Partner 
Interdependence and Technology Attributes.‖ The Academy of Management 
Journal. 43(6): 1045-1067.  
 
Stuart, Toby E., Ha Hoang, and Ralph C. Hybels 1999. ―Interorganizational 
Endorsements and the Performance of Entrepreneurial Ventures.‖ Administrative 
Science Quarterly. 44: 315-349. 
 
Sunder, M., 1996 ―Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of Exclusion: The Intellectual 
Propertization of Free Speech in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and 
Bisexual Group of Boston.‖ Stanford Law Review, 49, 143–172. 
 
Teece, David J., 1989 ―Inter-Organizational Requirements of the Innovation 
Process.‖ Managerial and Decision Economics. 10: 35-42. 
 
Teece, David J. 1986 ―Profiting form Technological Innovation: Implications for 
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy.‖ Research Policy. 15: 
285-305. 
 
Teece, David J. 1992 ―Competition, Cooperation, and Innovation.‖ Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization. 18: 1-25. 
 
Tirole, Jean. 1999 ―Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?‖ Econometrica, 
67(4): 741-781. 
 
Ulset, Svein, 1996 ―R&D Outsourcing and Contractual Governance: An Empirical 
Study of Commercial R&D Projects.‖ Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization. 30: 63-82. 
 
Vermeulen, Freek and Harry Varkema, 2001 ―Learning through Acquisitions.‖ 
Academy of Management Journal. 44(3): 457-476. 
 
Walker, G. and D. Weber, 1984 ―A Transaction Cost Approach to Make-or-Buy 
Decisions.‖ Administrative Science Quarterly 29: 373-391. 
 
Walker, G. and D. Weber, 1987 ―Supplier Competition, Uncertainty and Make-or-
Buy Decisions.‖ The Academy of Management Journal 30: 589-596. 
 
Wally, Stefan, and J Robert Baum, 1994, Personal and Structural Determinants of the 
Pace of the Strategic Decision Making, The Academy of Management Journal 37: 
932-956. 
 
Whinston, Michael D. 2003 ―On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical 
Integration.‖ Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. 19:1-23. 
 148 
 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1971 ―The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure 
Considerations.‖ American Economic Review. 61: 112-23.  
 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1975 Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications. New York: Free Press. 
 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1979. ―Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of 
Contractual Relations.‖ Journal of Law and Economics 22: 233-61.  
 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1985 The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free 
Press. 
 
Williamson, Oliver E. 2000 ―The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, 
Looking Ahead.‖ Journal of Economic Literature. 38(3): 595-613. 
 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1999 ―Comparative Economic Organization: An Analysis of 
Discrete Structural Alternatives.‖ Administrative Science Quarterly. 36(2): 269-
296. 
 
Williamson, Oliver E., 1988 ―Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance.‖ 
Journal of Finance. 43(3): 567-591. 
 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1991 ―Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of 
Discrete Structural Alternatives.‖ Administrative Science Quarterly 36(June): 
269-296. 
 
Windsperger, Josef and Rajiv P. Dant, 2006 ―Contractibility and Ownership 
Redirection in Franchising: A Property Rights View.‖ Journal of Retailing. 82 (3): 
259–272. 
  
Woodruff, Christopher M. 2002 ―Non-Contractible Investments and Vertical 
Integration in the Mexican Footwear Industry,‖ International Journal of 
Industrial Organization. 20 (8): 1197-1224. 
 
Yeoh, Poh-Lin, and Kendall Roth, 1999 ―An Empirical Analysis of Sustained 
Advantage in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry: Impact of Firm Resources and 
Capabilities.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 20(7): 637-653. 
 
Zaheer, Akbar, Bill McEvily, and Vincenzo Perrone, 1998 ―Does Trust Matter? 
Exploring the Effects of Interorganizational and Interpersonal Trust on 
Performance.‖ Organization Science. 9 (2): 141-159. 
  
Zajac, Edward J., and Cyrus P. Olsen, 1993 ―From Transaction Cost to Transaction 
Value Analysis: Implications for the Study of Interorganizational Strategies.‖ 
Journal of Management Studies. 30(1): 122-145.  
 149 
 
Zollo, Maurizio and Harbir Singh, 2004 ―Deliberate Learning in Corporate 
Acquisitions: Post-Acquisition Strategies and Integration Capabilities in U.S. 
Bank Mergers.‖ Strategic Management Journal. 25: 1233–1256.  
 
Zucker, Lynne G., Michael R. Darby, Jeff S. Armstrong, 2002 ―Commercializing 
Knolwedge: University Science, Knowledge Capture, and Firm Performance in 





Table A1: Ordered Logistic Analysis of R&D Progress 
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Link function: Logit 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, 
†
p<.1 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
